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Abstract
Essays on Labor Economics
Marianne Bernatzky Koehli
2021
The first chapter studies the life-cycle behavior of two cohorts of American women:
those born in the 1960s and those born in the 1980s. Millennial women are more likely
to work full time, work in professional, health, and education-related occupations,
and be childless in their mid-thirties than women born in the 1960s. I build a life-cycle
model that incorporates labor supply, occupation, and fertility choices, and estimate
the model for the older cohort. I analyze the role of two forces in explaining the data
patterns: (i) labor market factors, including changes in the wage structure and in
the initial joint distribution of workers’ skills and occupations’ skills requirements,
and (ii) family factors, including changes in marital status across cohorts. I find that
both mechanisms are important and together are able to (i) explain the changes in
occupational sorting across cohorts; (ii) predict 74% of the changes in the share of
women in full-time work; (iii) explain 85% of the decrease in the share of women with
two children and (iv) explain 81% of the increase in the share of childless women in
their mid-thirties.
The second chapter, which is work performed jointly with Lucas Finamor and Boryana Ilieva, studies women and men’s labor market and insurance decisions around
childbirth in Chile, a country with widespread informality. We identify three sectors
of employment: formal, informal and self-employment. An individual in the informal
sector works in a private firm without a labor contract and a self-employed person
is an independent worker. We document the following findings. First, there are no
significant changes in the share of workers with no labor contract after childbirth

for both men and women, but women are more likely to switch into self-employment
where the effect is larger for those highly educated. Second, we show that highly
educated women are more likely to work remotely after the first birth. In contrast,
low educated women do not change work location. Third, women are also more
likely to switch to less cognitive intensive occupations after childbirth, which may
explain the fall in wages after the event. Fourth, women are less likely to keep private
health insurance after their first birth. Finally, we explore the effects of the 2008
Chilean pension system reform on formal work decisions. We observe that women
who had children after 2008 are less likely to leave formal employment, in comparison
to women who had children before the reform was implemented.
In the third chapter, which is joint work with Paula Calvo and Zhengren Zhu,
we investigate the role of maternal mental health on children’s cognitive and mental
health development. We propose a model that incorporates maternal mental health
as a separate input in the human capital production function, different from cognitive and non-cognitive skills. We employ the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
1979, where we link mothers and their children, to document the empirical patterns
that motivate this study: First, poor maternal mental health is positively associated with poor mental health of her child and negatively associated with her child’s
cognitive development (which includes math and reading recognition). Second, poor
maternal mental health is associated with worse parental practices at different ages.
Third, children’s mental health problems affect their cognitive outcomes in school.
Fourth, children with poor mental health are more likely to have mental health problems in adult life, have lower wages and lower educational attainment. Our model
incorporates these key mechanisms. We describe the estimation steps and propose
counterfactual exercises.
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Chapter 1
Labor Market Behavior and
Fertility of Highly Educated
Women
1.1

Introduction

Highly educated women in the United States have drastically changed their labor
supply, occupation, and fertility choices over the last 40 years. When comparing the
share of women in full-time employment of two cohorts, those born in the 1960s and
those born in the 1980s, I observe that women in the younger cohort are more likely to
work full time, especially during their early thirties, the most common child rearing
years. Occupational sorting also shows significant changes. Women in the younger
cohort are more likely to work in professional, health, and education-related jobs,
which demand high cognitive and social skills. This change comes as women leave
traditionally female clerical jobs, including secretarial and administrative assistant
positions. At the same time, fertility behavior has changed, as women in the younger
cohort are more likely to be childless or have a smaller number of children in their

1

mid 30s.1
The goal of this paper is to construct a life-cycle model of labor supply, occupational choice, and fertility decisions that can jointly explain these changes. I explore
the extent to which variation in labor market incentives and in family formation can
generate the patterns observed in the data. Studying the changes in behavior in a
unified way allows for a better understanding of how a change in the wage structure
that affects labor supply and occupational choices also influences fertility outcomes,
and how a change in family formation that directly affects fertility outcomes has
spillover effects on labor market outcomes. In addition, apart from studying the
main drivers of changes in behavior of highly educated women, my analysis sheds
light on the forces that contribute to the reduction in the occupational gender gap,
especially in managerial and professional sectors (Blau and Winkler (2017)).2
I build a life-cycle model with three endogenous decisions: labor supply, occupation, and fertility. The first choice involves working part-time, full-time, or not
at all. The second choice involves choosing among five different occupations: (i)
manager/professional, (ii) health/education, (iii) services, (iv) clerical, and (v) science. The third is a fertility choice, where a woman decides to have a child or not,
conditional on her fertility status. In each period, there is a probability of being
single, married to a low educated husband or married to a highly educated husband. This process is exogenous, and transition probabilities are estimated from
the data. There is also a probability of being fertile in each period; this evolves
with age mirroring the biological clock.3 In the model, women have cognitive and
social skills. Occupations differ in their cognitive and social skill requirements, mea1

See also Heck, Schoendorf, Ventura, and Kiely (1997), Blau and Winkler (2017), Cortes,
Jaimovich, and Siu (2018).
2
Highly educated women increased participation in managerial and professional jobs, while men
experienced no changes across cohorts (Figure 1.7 in Section 1.8.1).
3
These probabilities are taken from Trussell and Wilson (1985).

2

suring the degree to which these skills are needed to perform tasks in a particular
occupation. I consider cognitive and social skills as the two major skill dimensions
of highly skilled individuals, along which they sort in the labor market. Each skill
type accumulates depending on the complementarity between a worker’s skills and
the current occupation skill requirements. Thus workers accumulate more skills in
occupations in which they are more productive. Women also accumulate experience
by working, with the accumulation rate depending on age and hours of work. This
feature makes early career interruptions very costly and allows the model to explain
the empirical timing of fertility. Wages are a function of a worker’s skills, current
occupation’s skill requirements, mismatch between the skills of the worker and the
skill requirements of her occupation (a source of wage penalty that grows based on
the distance between these two factors), and experience. Wages are an important
determinant of occupational and labor supply choices, which can also affect fertility
outcomes.
My model has a number of distinct features. First and most importantly, I consider choices related to labor supply, occupation, and fertility jointly. The decision
to have children is not independent of the choice of how many hours to work or
which occupation to select, so variations in the returns to workers’ skills and skill
requirements of occupations will have implications for fertility decisions. In a similar way, family formation changes that affect fertility, such as changes in marriage
patterns, will also affect labor supply decisions. Second, occupations in my model
differ in their skill requirements. The requirements affect wages, not only directly
but also through skill mismatch. Third, individuals have multiple observable skills
that accumulate over the life cycle. These skills are relevant for occupational choice,
as women find it desirable to sort into occupations favorable to skill accumulation.
However, aiming too high is costly because the mismatch is penalized by lower wages.

3

It is important to highlight that the return to skills, skill requirements, and the skill
mismatch differs by skill dimension.
To motivate my analysis, I use data from CPS, NLSY79, NLSY97 and O*NET to
obtain measures of workers’ skills, requirements of occupations, and to document the
key empirical facts. I use the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) as a proxy for
cognitive skills, and measures of non-cognitive skills and youth delinquency behavior
as proxies for social skills.4 In order to construct the measure of cognitive and social
skill requirements, I consider a set of O*NET descriptors that capture, respectively,
core analytical tasks and tasks that involve social interactions.
Three key patterns emerge: (i) there is an increase in the share of women employed in full-time work across cohorts, especially during their thirties (from 52% to
60%); (ii) women are increasingly employed in managerial, professional, health, and
education-related jobs, which have high requirements for cognitive and social skills,
and decreasingly employed in clerical jobs; and (iii) there is an increase in the share
of childless women among women in their mid-thirties (from 27% to 35%), as well
as a decrease in the share of women with two children (from 34% to 27%).
I estimate the model using the method of simulated moments (McFadden (1989),
Pakes and Pollard (1989)) for the cohort of women born in the 1960s and show that
the model fits the data well. I then use these estimates to conduct counterfactuals.
Given preferences fixed to the 1960 level, I explore the role of two channels that can
shape decisions on labor supply, occupation, and fertility. The first channel concerns
the changes across cohorts in the wage structure, in the initial joint distribution
of workers’ skills, and in occupations’ skills requirements. I refer to this as the
‘Labor Market’ channel. The second channel concerns the changes in the prevalence
of marriage across cohorts, which refer to different transition rates into and out
4

I take the AFQT scores from Altonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange (2012).

4

of marriage. I refer to this as the ‘Family’ channel. I provide empirical evidence
illustrating the changes over time. In reference to the ‘Labor Market’ channel, wage
regressions across cohorts show an increase in the importance of cognitive and social
skill requirements on wages, and an increase in the mismatch cost of social skills.
In addition, there are changes in mean skill requirements for various occupations
across cohorts, where, for example, clerical and science occupations have increased
their cognitive and social requirements. The initial joint distribution of workers’
skills does not change much across cohorts. With respect to the ‘Family’ channel, I
observe that women born in the 1980s (the later cohort) are more likely to be single
than women born in the 1960s.
I run three counterfactual exercises. In the first counterfactual, I set the wage
structure, initial distribution of workers’ skills, and skill requirements of occupations
to those of the 1980 cohort, while keeping all other parameters at their 1960 level.
I find that the ‘Labor Market’ channel explains almost perfectly the changes in
occupational sorting, where women increase employment in managerial, professional,
health and education-related jobs, and decrease employment in clerical jobs. Changes
in both the wage structure and occupations’ skill requirements are key to explaining
the data patterns. The change in the wage structure creates incentives to move
towards occupations that are intensive in cognitive and social skill use, such as health
and education-related jobs. But this change alone generates too much employment
in health and education jobs and too little in science and clerical jobs. The change
in the mean skill requirements of occupations across cohorts counterbalances this
extreme effect.
As women move into occupations with higher wages, they prefer to be employed
full time to reap the full returns from working in such occupations. The changes
in the wage structure across cohorts also involve a small increase in the returns to

5

experience, contributing to the increase in full-time work. Overall, I find that the
‘Labor Market’ channel explains 56% of the overall change in the share of women
working full time across cohorts. This mechanism also has an effect on fertility choice,
explaining 25% of the overall decrease in the share of women with two children and
25% of the increase in the share of women who are childless. This result is consistent
with the fact that in the model it is more costly to work longer hours when one has
children, highlighting the interdependence of labor market and fertility choices.
In the second counterfactual exercise, I set marriage probabilities over the life
cycle, initial distribution of children, and initial marital status to those of the cohort
born in the 1980s. I show that the ‘Family’ channel explains 51% of the total change
in the share of childless women and 50% of the overall change in the share of women
with two children. The decline in marriage across cohorts increases the proportion
of single women, which translates into different economies of scale at the household
level, making children more expensive. In addition, there is a link between labor
supply and fertility choices, because childcare costs are higher for women working
longer hours. This channel is able to explain 18% of the change in full-time work.
Finally, the ‘Family’ channel does not substantially change the incentives to switch
occupations.
Finally, I run a third counterfactual exercise that combines both ‘Labor Market’
and ‘Family’ channels. The two together are able to (i) explain almost perfectly the
changes in occupational sorting across cohorts; (ii) predict 74% of the increase in the
share of women in full-time work; (iii) explain 85% of the decrease in the share of
women with two children; and (iv) explain 81% of the increase in the share of childless
women in their mid-thirties. Both the ‘Labor Market’ and ‘Family’ channels are
needed to account for the observed changes in occupational sorting, full-time work,
and fertility. The relation between labor supply and fertility decisions plays a vital
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role.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, I review the related
literature. In Section 1.3, I describe the data and key empirical patterns that motivate this paper. In Section 1.4, I describe the model. In Section 1.5, I introduce the
estimation procedure, discuss parameter estimates and model fit. In Section 1.6, I
carry out my main counterfactual exercises to explore how labor market and family changes affected occupational sorting, labor supply and fertility choices across
cohorts. In Section 1.7, I conclude.

1.2

Related Literature

The aim of this paper is to unravel the causes behind highly educated women’s
change in labor supply, occupation and children choices across cohorts. I develop
a framework that includes these three endogenous choices and that allows performing counterfactuals to assess the relative importance of labor market and family
changes as key drivers of these outcomes. This paper contributes to three strands of
the literature: research on recent changes in women’s labor market and fertility behavior; multi-dimensional heterogeneity and matching; and literature on structural
approaches to study labor supply, occupation, and fertility choices in a dynamic
setting.

Changes in Women’s Labor Market and Fertility Behavior. There are several explanations in the literature for why the labor supply of women has increased
over time. These typically focus on the extensive margin and on older cohorts. Works
in this vein examine: change in divorce laws (Stevenson (2008), Fernández and Wong
(2014), Voena (2015)), lower childcare costs (Attanasio, Low, and Sánchez-Marcos
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(2008)), cultural change (Fernández (2013), Goussé, Jacquemet, and Robin (2017)),
change in wages (Eckstein and Lifshitz (2011), Goussé, Jacquemet, and Robin (2017)
Eckstein, Keane, and Lifshitz (2019)), home production technology (Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2005)), and decreasing discrimination (Jones, Manuelli, and
McGrattan (2015)). There is little evidence with respect to changes in the intensive
margin over time, but exceptions are Olivetti (2006) and Ngai and Petrongolo (2017).
On the fertility dimension, existing literature focuses on the role of wages and marriage market (Caucutt, Guner, and Knowles (2002)) and contraception technology
(Eckstein, Keane, and Lifshitz (2019)) to explain fertility decisions. These papers
address changes for older cohorts as well. There is a growing body of literature that
focuses on women’s increased participation in services and socially intensive jobs
(Borghans, Ter Weel, and Weinberg (2014), Cerina, Moro, and Rendall (2017), Ngai
and Petrongolo (2017), Cortes, Jaimovich, and Siu (2018)). With the exception of
Ngai and Petrongolo (2017), which studies the rise in the services sector and female
hours, these papers focus on occupational choices, without taking into account hours,
fertility choices, or life-cycle considerations in occupational choices.

Multi-dimensional Heterogeneity and Matching. There is a vast and growing
body of literature on multi-dimensional human capital, where workers are characterized by various skills (e.g.: cognitive, manual, social) and work in occupations that
differ in the tasks intensity (Gathmann and Schönberg (2010), Deming (2017), Lindenlaub (2017), Taber and Roys (2019), Atalay, Phongthiengtham, Sotelo, and Tannenbaum (2020), Guvenen, Kuruscu, Tanaka, and Wiczer (2020), Lise and PostelVinay (2020), Tan (2020)). My paper is closest to Lise and Postel-Vinay (2020) and
Taber and Roys (2019), who use a life-cycle approach, with workers’ skills evolving
over the life-cycle and accumulation depending on the occupations’ skill require-
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ments. I also build on Guvenen, Kuruscu, Tanaka, and Wiczer (2020) as wages
depend on the skill mismatch, measured as a distance between a worker’s skills and
the occupation’s skill requirements. All these papers, however, are focused on the
behavior of men and do not incorporate important life-cycle considerations such as
hours of work, family formation, or fertility.

Dynamic Models with Labor Supply, Occupation, and Fertility Choices.
I build on other papers that develop dynamic models to study women’s life-cycle
behavior, such as Eckstein and Lifshitz (2011), Fernández and Wong (2014), Blundell, Costa Dias, Meghir, and Shaw (2016), Adda, Dustmann, and Stevens (2017),
and Eckstein, Keane, and Lifshitz (2019). The closest to mine is Adda, Dustmann,
and Stevens (2017), which is the only other paper to the best of my knowledge that
incorporates the three endogenous choices on which I focus. Both my model and my
objectives differ from those of Adda, Dustmann, and Stevens (2017) in the following
respects. First, their purpose is to quantify the career costs of children, while my
objective is to understand what drives changes in women’s occupational sorting, labor supply and fertility across cohorts. Second, individuals have multiple observable
skills that accumulate over the life cycle. These skills are relevant for occupational
choice, as women find attractive to go to occupations where they accumulate more of
their skills, but at the same time they are aware of potential wage penalties arising
from skills mismatch. In Adda, Dustmann, and Stevens (2017), individuals differ in
unobserved ability and experience. Further, I also focus on highly educated women
(college or more), while Adda, Dustmann, and Stevens (2017) focus on women who
attend low track schools. Third, occupations in my model differ on skill requirements,
which affect wages not only through a direct impact but also through skill mismatch.
While Adda, Dustmann, and Stevens (2017) incorporate the fact that different oc-

9

cupations have different wage paths, I opt for a more parsimonious wage function
where wage differences across occupations arise from observable characteristics (i.e.,
task intensity). The introduction of heterogeneity in skills and skill requirements
of occupations is vital to analyzing the changes in occupational sorting over time,
as women have incentives to switch to occupations that are cognitive and socially
intensive, such as managerial, professional, education and health-related jobs.

1.3

Data and Descriptive Evidence

1.3.1

Data

In my analysis, I concentrate on women in the United States who have at least a
college degree.5 I draw on five datasets: Current Population Survey (CPS), National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79), NLSY97, Occupational Information
Network (O*NET) and Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).
The CPS dataset provides information on employment, hours of work and occupational choices for cohorts born in the years 1956-1960 and 1980-1984.6 I call
these cohorts throughout this paper the ‘1960 cohort’ and the ‘1980 cohort’, respectively. I define a full-time worker as one who works more than 35 weekly hours. In
order to have a consistent classification of occupations over time, I use crosswalk
files from Autor and Dorn (2013) and I further organize workers into five groups:
(i) manager/professionals, (ii) health/education, (iii) services, (iv) clerical, and (v)
science. In the case of the science occupations, I also include engineers and computer
scientists.
The NLSY79 and NLSY97 datasets track national representative samples of in5

I focus on women with a college degree because they are the ones that increase full-time work,
move into professional occupations and delay fertility the most in their early thirties.
6
Data from IPUMS-CPS, University of Minnesota, www.ipums.org (Flood, King, Rodgers,
Ruggles, and Warren (2020)).
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dividuals who were 14-22 and 12-17 years of age, respectively, when first interviewed
in 1979 and 1997. I build a panel from 1979 to 2016 for NLSY79 and another from
1997 to 2017 for NLSY97. These provide information on labor supply, wages, worker
skills, children, marital status and occupation for each individual. In both cases,
I retain highly educated women and exclude poor white women and women in the
military in the NLSY79 sample, and ‘mixed race women’ in the NLSY97 sample.7
The subsamples used in this study have 1,433 individuals for NLSY79 and 1,756 individuals for NLSY97. For the construction of tables and empirical analysis, I retain
women between 24 and 46 years old for both datasets, as fertility is completed by
one’s mid-forties.8
The O*NET dataset offers detailed measures of skills, abilities and knowledge
required to perform tasks in different occupations.9 I use this dataset to construct
the two-dimensional vector of job tasks: cognitive and social. I work with the version
9.0, which includes information on over 970 occupations. For each of them, O*NET
gives a score for the relevance of 277 descriptors. I use nine of these descriptors that
are most related to the skills I select from NLSY79 and NLSY97.
I also use the SIPP to obtain weekly childcare costs for women working full time
and part time. I use the data from wave 1993, a time when mothers in NLSY79 were
in their mid-thirties.10

Worker Skills
I construct the cognitive and social measures of a worker’s skills using the Armed
Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) score and measures of social skills. More specifically,
7

White poor women were not followed after 1984 for NLSY79 and women could not identify as
mixed race in NLSY79.
8
For NLSY97, I have information on respondents until age 37.
9
This data set is developed under the sponsorship of the U.S. Department of Labor/Employment
and Training Administration.
10
Data from https://www.census.gov/data/tables/1993/demo/ppl-138.html.
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to serve as proxies for cognitive skills, I rely on AFQT scores from Altonji, Bharadwaj,
and Lange (2012). To obtain measures of social skills, I use the Rosenberg SelfEsteem Scale, the Ten-Item Personality Inventory and three measures of criminal
behavior. In the last case, I run Principal Component Analysis (PCA) on this set of
descriptors and keep the first principal component, which defines the social skills of
the worker. Finally, I covert the measures of cognitive and social skills into percentile
ranks and restrict the measure to the interval [0,1]. Similar measures of cognitive
and social skills have been used in Deming (2017), Lise and Postel-Vinay (2020) and
Tan (2020). I convert to percentile ranks as in Guvenen, Kuruscu, Tanaka, and
Wiczer (2020) because the scales of skills and skill requirements are different, and as
I consider the effect of mismatch between a worker’s skills and the occupation’s skill
requirements on wages, I want them to be comparable.
Table 1.1 reports the correlation between workers’ skills in our sample for (a) the
1960 Cohort and (b) the 1980 Cohort and shows that there is almost no correlation
between social and cognitive skills.
Table 1.1: Correlation of Worker Skills

Cognitive
Social

(a) Worker Skills
Cohort 1960

(b) Worker Skills
Cohort 1980

Cognitive

Social

Cognitive

Social

1.00

1.00
-0.01

1.00

1.00
0.18

Note: Data from NLSY79 and NLSY97. I compute correlations on initial cognitive and social initial skills for the
samples of 1,433 and 1,756 women for 1960 and 1980 cohorts, respectively.

Occupation Skill Requirements
The O*NET dataset provides job descriptors to build the cognitive and social skill
requirements. In order to construct the measure of cognitive skill, I consider the
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measures ‘mathematical reasoning’, ‘number facility’, ‘memorization’, and ‘reading
comprehension’, which capture core analytical tasks in the job. In a similar way,
I select the measures ‘social perceptiveness’, ‘contact with others’, ‘assisting others’, ‘service orientation’ and ‘personal service’, which relate to social skills. Next, I
aggregate O*NET scores at the SOC level, use a crosswalk to convert to Census Occupation codes, and finally convert to a time consistent classification of occupations
using the crosswalk files from Autor and Dorn (2013).
I merge this occupation information with worker data from NLSY79 and NLSY97,
I run PCA on these two set of descriptors, and keep the first principal components,
which are the cognitive and social measures of an occupation. As a last step, I
convert the principal components into percentile ranks, restrict the measures to the
interval [0,1] and generate measures for five occupation groups. I report the skill
requirements for the different occupation groups in Table 1.2. Manager, professional, and science occupations have the highest cognitive skill requirements for both
NLSY79 and NLSY97 samples. These occupations differ in terms of the social skills
component, as science requires very few such skills. Health and education-related
occupations require the highest levels of social skills, but the level of cognitive tasks
is below that of professional occupations. Occupation requirements change across cohorts. For example, science occupations increase the social skill requirements (from
0.28 to 0.35) and clerical occupations increase the cognitive skill requirements (from
0.48 to 0.57). As the measures of occupation skill requirements are obtained through
percentile ranks, there are two explanations for this. First, the increase in cognitive
requirements of clerical occupations and in social requirements of science occupations, for instance, means that in the 1980 cohort there are more workers in clerical
jobs with higher cognitive skill requirements and in science jobs with higher social
skill requirements than in the previous cohort. This is a within-occupation group
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change in the skill requirements.11 Second, the change in the distribution of occupations across cohorts can affect the mean percentile rank assigned to an occupation
group. For example, the fall in the mean cognitive requirement for managerial and
professional occupations can be affected by the fact that more women are employed
in this occupation in the 1980 cohort.
Table 1.2: Skill Requirements of Occupations

Occupation
Manager/Professionals
Health/Education
Services
Clerical
Science

Cohort 1960
Cognitive Social
0.82
0.49
0.42
0.72
0.39
0.43
0.48
0.35
0.79
0.28

Cohort 1980
Cognitive Social
0.80
0.51
0.41
0.69
0.42
0.45
0.57
0.36
0.81
0.35

Note: Data from NLSY79 and NLSY97, women between ages 24 and 36 (to have consistent measures across cohorts).
Columns report average cognitive and social skill requirements for each occupation group for 1960 and 1980 cohorts.

1.3.2

Descriptive Evidence

Key Patterns in the Data
In this section I document labor supply, occupation, and fertility patterns for highly
educated women born in the 1960s and 1980s, respectively. Figure 1.1 reports the
share of women employed and working full-time over the life-cycle. Highly educated
women are very attached to the labor market, with employment rates around 80%
for both cohorts. The most striking change is that the share of women in full-time
work increased from 53% to 60% between the ages of 32 and 38. The number of hours
worked by women in the younger cohort did not decrease over the life-cycle, unlike
11

I observe that the raw mean scores of cognitive skill requirements for clerical occupations
increase across cohorts as well as the raw mean score of social skill requirements for science occupations. This computation is performed using the raw score from principal component analysis
normalized in an interval of [0,1].
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the number of hours worked by women in the older cohort, which could potentially
be related to changes in fertility choices across these cohorts, such as changes in
motherhood or family size. In contrast to the behavior of highly educated women,
highly educated men do not change their labor supply behavior (Figure 1.6 in Section
1.8.1).
Figure 1.1: Labor Supply of Highly Educated Women

Note: CPS data. Employment and Full-time work of highly educated women, for 1956-1960 and 1980-1984 cohorts.
Full-time workers are defined as those individuals working more than 35 hours per week. The gray color represents
the 1960 cohort and the blue color the 1980 cohort.

Taking a closer look at fertility patterns across cohorts, in Table 1.3 I show that the
share of women with no children has increased over time, from 29% to 36% by the
age of 37. By that age, the percentage of women with two children has also declined,
from 34% to 27%. The share of women with one child is stable over time.
Table 1.3: Share of Highly Educated Women with different numbers of children
Age

25
30
37

No Children
1960
71%
45%
29%

1980
72%
50%
36%

1 Child
2 Children
Cohort
1960 1980 1960 1980
19% 17% 11% 10%
22% 22% 23% 18%
18% 18% 34% 27%

>3 Children
1960
4%
11%
20%

1980
3%
10%
18%

Note: Data from NLSY79 and NLSY97. Columns report the percentages of women with no children, 1 child, 2
children and 3 children or more by ages 25, 30 and 37 for 1960 and 1980 cohorts.
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Figure 1.2 reports changes in occupational choices over time for the two cohorts
based on CPS data. The share of women in professional, managerial, education,
and health-related occupations increased over time, while the share of women in
clerical jobs such as secretarial and administrative positions decreased over time.
Importantly, the former occupational groups have higher cognitive and social skill
requirements than those associated with clerical occupations (Table 1.2).
Figure 1.2: Occupational Choices of Highly Educated Women

Note: CPS data. Share of employed women in each occupation group, ages 22-32. The gray color represents the
1960 cohort and the blue color the 1980 cohort.
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Potential explanatory mechanisms
One of the potential explanatory factors for the change in behavior in the labor
market and fertility is the change in the wage structure over time, taken in conjunction with the change in the initial distribution of workers’ skills and occupations’
skill requirements. For instance, an increase in the returns of cognitive and social
skill requirements would lead to different occupational sorting over time, as there
are incentives to switch to occupations that highly demand these skills. Table 1.4
shows results from a regression where the dependent variable is ln wages and the
regressors are skills of a worker, skill requirements of the current occupation (both
cognitive and social), mismatch between the worker’s skills and the occupation’s skill
requirements (measured by the absolute value of the distance between worker skills
and skill requirements in the current occupation), and experience. In column (2) I
observe that cognitive and social skills and skill requirements have positive returns.
A mismatch in the cognitive dimension has a negative impact on wages, whereas the
coefficient for the social mismatch is not significant.12
Column (4) shows that the return to cognitive and social requirements increased
across cohorts, but more so in the social dimension. This change may have an impact
on occupational sorting, where workers find incentives to move toward high-cognitive
and high-social occupations. In addition, the change in wages may potentially affect
labor supply and fertility. These changes in wages are not independent of the change
in the initial distribution of workers’ skills and the occupational skill requirements,
which also change across cohorts. The results from the model allow disentangling the
individual contributions of each of these factors. I also observe that the mismatch
12

In Section 1.8.2, I show alternative wage specifications, where I include positive and negative
mismatches for under- and overqualification. I observe that the penalty on wages is driven by
over qualification in the cognitive dimension. However, I chose to employ a parsimonious wage
specification with absolute value on the skill mismatch.
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in the social dimension becomes stronger across cohorts, which could disincentivize
women to sort into high social occupations if they have a low level of social skills.
Table 1.4: Wage Regressions

Cohort
Cognitive Skills (xc )

Regression of ln wages
1960
1960
(1)
(2)
∗∗∗
0.350
0.342∗∗∗
(0.0305) (0.0298)

1980
. (3)
0.372∗∗∗
(0.0325)

1980
(4)
0.256∗∗∗
(0.0327)

Social Skills (xs )

0.153∗∗∗
(0.0294)

0.163∗∗∗
(0.0290)

0.121∗∗∗
(0.0312)

0.091∗∗
(0.0308)

Cognitive Requirement (yc )

0.892∗∗∗
(0.0583)

0.727∗∗∗
(0.0579)

1.292∗∗∗
(0.0673)

1.269∗∗∗
(0.0674)

Social Requirement (ys )

0.490∗∗∗
(0.0523)

0.428∗∗∗
(0.0526)

1.322∗∗∗
(0.0685)

1.245∗∗∗
(0.0676)

|xc − yc |

-0.165∗∗
(0.0526)

-0.125∗∗∗
(0.0559)

|xs − ys |

0.009
(0.0429)

-0.078∗
(0.0519)

Experience

0.037∗∗∗
(0.00450)

0.041∗∗∗
(0.00461)

Constant
R2
Observations

1.776∗∗∗
(0.0435)

1.660∗∗∗
(0.0481)

1.250∗∗∗
(0.0622)

1.031∗∗∗
(0.0692)

0.109
10,933

0.163
10,933

0.148
15,302

0.210
15,302

Note: Data from NLSY79 and NLSY97, highly educated women ages 24-36. Columns show coefficients from a
regression of ln wages that includes cognitive and social skills and skill requirements, mismatch on the cognitive
and social dimensions defined as the absolute distance between skills and requirements, experience and a constant.
Results are reported for the 1960 and 1980 cohorts. Wages are in 2016 constant dollars, and I trim values of the real
hourly wage that are below 3 and above 200. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

A second factor I explore is the change in marital status of women across cohorts.
Figure 1.3 shows that the percentage of highly educated women who are single in
their mid-twenties and early thirties is considerably higher in the younger cohort.
This may potentially have implications for labor supply and fertility; I will explore
such possibilities in the model.
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Figure 1.3: Marital Status over the Life Cycle by Cohort

Note: NLSY79 and NLSY97 data. The categories are defined as follows: single, married to a low educated husband
(high school or less) and married to a highly educated husband (more than high school). Solid lines represent
women from the 1960 cohort and dashed lines from the 1980 cohort. In this definition of marriage, I do not consider
cohabitation.

1.4

Model

In this section I describe the model I use to evaluate the mechanisms underlying
the changes in labor supply, occupation, and fertility of highly educated women.
Each woman maximizes the present value of her utility over a finite horizon and
makes three choices. The first choice involves whether to work part time, full time
or not at all. The second choice involves choosing among five different occupations:
(i) manager/professional, (ii) education/health, (iii) services, (iv) clerical and (v)
science. The third choice is about fertility, where the woman decides to have a child
or not, conditional on her fertility status. She can have up to three children. Each
period is two years and the period under consideration begins at the age of 24 and
ends at the age of 45. I only consider highly educated women, and so I take education
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as given.13
In each period, a woman may be fertile or infertile, and there is uncertainty with
respect to fertility status (ft ) in the next period. The probability of being fertile
evolves over the life-cycle, reflecting the nature of the biological clock. Women may
be married or unmarried, with transitions occurring randomly over the life cycle
according to a stochastic process that depends on age, following the pattern I observe
in the data. Although I treat marriage as an exogenous process, I account for marital
sorting by specifying three categories: single, married to a low educated husband, and
married to a highly educated husband. The marriage probabilities reflect observed
sorting patterns.
Observed heterogeneity in the model is captured by the set of cognitive (xc ) and
social skills (xs ), which evolve over the life cycle depending on the occupation in which
an individual is employed and her employment status.14 I do not include unobserved
skill heterogeneity in my model because I have rich information on observable characteristics that determine a worker’s productivity such as test scores and personality
traits. Women also differ in unobserved preference for work, which is random and
drawn at the beginning of their working lives. Occupations are defined by a set of
cognitive and social skill requirements (yc , ys as described in Table 1.2). Occupation
taste shocks affect individual’s choices and, along with skill accumulation, generate
occupational mobility. This is captured by the term ν.
The rest of this section discusses the utility function and decisions; human cap13

Changes in the labor market and marriage market incentives may have an impact on college
education decisions, changing the characteristics of women with at least a college degree (Bronson
(2015), Guvenen and Rendall (2015), Chiappori, Dias, and Meghir (2018)). In order to analyze
potential differences in observable characteristics of highly educated women across cohorts, I take
the raw scores of cognitive and social skills for the 1960 and 1980 cohorts together and compute
percentile ranks. I find that the means of cognitive skills are 0.48 and 0.51 for the 1960 and 1980
cohorts, respectively. The overall distributions are quite similar across cohorts. In the case of social
skills, the means are 0.49 for both cohorts.
14
I discretize the state space for cognitive and social skills of the worker into five and four types,
respectively. This makes a total of 20 types of workers combining their social and cognitive skills.
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ital accumulation and wages; marriage and fertility processes; and the individual
maximization problem.

1.4.1

Utility Function, Constraints and Choices

In each period, a woman makes three choices. First, she decides on fertility kt ∈
{0, 1}, which is the decision to have a child or not. Second, she chooses occupation
ot ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, Out}, which for modeling purposes includes non-employment Out.
Third, she decides whether to work part time or full time lt ∈ {P T, F T }, conditional
on working. The deterministic part of flow utility is a linear function of consumption
ct , labor supply lt , number of children nt and occupation ot . Consumption is adjusted
by an equivalence scale eq that is a function of the household composition.15 A
woman may experience disutility from time spent at work which varies by whether
she works part-time or full-time, and is captured by parameters γ1P T,m,ω and γ1F T,m,ω .
The subscript ω = {1, 2} represents permanent unobserved heterogeneity in the
taste for work, which affects preferences for labor supply. There is heterogeneity
by marital status, captured by the subscript m ∈ {married, single}. I also allow
for the interaction of children and labor supply captured by γ2P T,m,j and γ2F T,m,j . In
the model, my subjects can have up to three children j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. In addition,
women derive utility from the number of children represented by γ3m,j . Finally,
women have a taste for the current occupation in which they are employed, denoted
by γlo , where l ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. The permanent taste for given occupations refers to
(i) manager/professionals, (ii) health/education, (iii) services, (iv) clerical and (iv)
science. The parameters that capture work disutility, the interaction of children and
15

I follow Blundell, Costa Dias, Meghir, and Shaw (2016) and consider eq = 1 for singles, 1.6
for couples, 1.4 for a mother with child, and 2 for a couple with children. An extension of this
model would include an equivalence scale that is affected by the number of children instead of
being affected only by their presence or absence.
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labor supply, and the utility from children depend on marital status m (single or
married).
Work Disutility

ut (ct , lt , nt , ot ) =
+

ct
eq
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Utility from occupation

An individual’s per-period budget constraint is defined as follows:
cit = wit ht + 40with 1 (mit = married) − κlt 1(infantt = 1)

(1.2)

Consumption ct is equal to the woman’s earnings plus the husband’s earnings
if she is married (mt = married), minus childcare costs if she has an infant child
(infantt = 1). The woman’s earnings are defined as the hourly wage wit multiplied
by the hours ht , which are 40 if she is working full time or 18 if she is working part
time. The husband’s earnings are defined as with ∗ 40, where with is the hourly wage
and 40 is the hours of work, as I assume that husbands are working full time. The
fact that men are full-time workers is a common assumption in much of the literature
(Attanasio, Low, and Sánchez-Marcos (2008), Fernández (2013), Adda, Dustmann,
and Stevens (2017)).16
There are childcare costs to pay if a woman has an infant child (defined here as
age less than 4 years old) and is working. I estimate the childcare costs for women
working part time (lt = 1) or full time (lt = 2), which are captured in κlt . In my
16

My current model does not allow for income effects, a next step will extend this model to
incorporate the interaction between the woman’s consumption and her labor supply in the utility
function.
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current setup, the linear utility in consumption implies that agents do not seek to
smooth consumption over time or over states of the world. Hence the inclusion of
savings would not affect the labor supply decision. Also note that this static budget
constraint is common in the modeling of dynamic labor supply (Eckstein and Lifshitz
(2011), Eckstein, Keane, and Lifshitz (2019)).

1.4.2

Wages and Human Capital

Women have cognitive xc and social xs skills that depreciate by a constant rate δr ,
where r ∈ {c, s}. Skills also accumulate while women work, and the complementarity
between a worker’s skills xr and the skill requirements yor of her occupation plays
an important role in learning (Gregory (2021)). The accumulation parameter γr is
constant and skill specific. The law of motion for xr is:

xrit+1 = xrit (1 − δr ) + γr xrit yorit

(1.3)

Experience et accumulates depending on whether an individual is working part
time or full time (lt ) and on the woman’s age through the function g(age, lit ). This
function takes value zero if the person is out of work, but its values need to be
estimated for lt ∈ {P T, F T }, i.e., part-time and full-time work. I allow for a different
accumulation of experience depending on the age of the woman to capture the timing
of fertility and the fact that career interruptions early in a career can be detrimental.17

eit+1 = eit + g(age, lit )

(1.4)

The wage is a function of a worker’s skills xr , the skill requirements of her current
occupation yor , the degree of mismatch between her skills and the requirements of
17

In particular, I consider three stages: 24-31; 32-39 and 40-45.
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the occupation |xr − yor |, and experience e.18
ln wit = α1 +

X

α2r xrit +

+

α4r |xrit

−

r
yoit
|

r
α3r yoit

r=c,s

r=c,s

X

X

(1.5)

+ α5 ln(eit + 1)

r=c,s

There is measurement error it in the wage, so observed wages are ln wit∗ = ln wit +
it .

1.4.3

Fertility and Marital Status

Women face an infertility shock ft = {I, F } in each period; it arrives at the beginning
of the period with probability p. Once the shock is realized, and if the woman is
fertile, she decides whether to have a child. If the woman is infertile, there is no
choice to be made. I model infertility as an absorbing state; once infertile, a woman
is infertile until the end of her life. Regarding marriage, there is a probability of being
single, married to a low educated husband and married to a high educated husband
in each period. Women consider both probabilities from marriage and fertility when
making decisions.

1.4.4

Individual Maximization Problem

At the start of each period, individuals take as given the current state: Ωt =
{t, xct , xst , et , nt−1 , ageK
t−1 , ft , mt , νt }. The state space is composed of variables set at
the end of the previous period: number of children nt−1 and ageK
t−1 of the youngest
kid. It also comprises variables updated at the start of the period: age t, cognitive
skills xct , social skills xst , experience et , fertility status ft , marital status mt and i.i.d
extreme value distributed occupation shocks νt , with CDF Gν = exp(exp( −ν
)).
σν
18

I am currently estimating the model with different wage specifications, including mismatches
for over- and underqualification that are not symmetrical, as displayed in Section 1.8.2.
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The value function for individual i in period t is:

Vt (Ωt ) = max {ut (ct , lt , nt , ot ) + νt (ot ) + βEt Vt+1 (Ωt+1 )}
ot ,lt ,kt

(1.6)

where β is a discount factor, and Et is the expectation over future occupation
preference shocks, fertility and marital status.

1.5

Estimation

The estimation of the model parameters follows a two-step procedure. First, I estimate some parameters outside of the model. Second, I estimate preference, female
wages and human capital accumulation process parameters inside the model.

1.5.1

Parameters Estimated Outside the Model

Fertility Probability I set age-dependent probabilities of infertility following the
literature on infertility risk (Sommer (2016), Trussell and Wilson (1985)). Even
though these papers estimate the fraction of couples permanently infertile by the
age of the wife, this is the closest estimation of infertility by age available in the
literature.19

Marriage and Divorce Probabilities I estimate the probabilities of a partner
arriving and leaving by age. Figure 1.5 shows the distribution of women into different marital statuses as a function of age: single, married to a low educated husband
and married to a highly educated husband. The displayed simulated profiles are very
close to the observed data ones. The data show that a woman who is highly educated
is more likely to be married to a highly educated man, and the probability of this
19

It would be better to use the fraction of women permanently infertile by age.
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Figure 1.4: Fraction of Infertile Couples

Note: Data from Trussell and Wilson (1985) is displayed in blue dots, fitted by an exponential function (red line).

type of marriage increases with age. The share of women married to low educated
husbands is low and increases only slightly over the life cycle. The estimated transition probabilities show that the probability of divorce is higher when an educated
woman is married to a low educated man.
Figure 1.5: Marital Status of Highly Educated Women

Note: NLSY79 data. The categories are defined as follows: single, married to a low educated husband (high school
or less) and married to a highly educated husband (more than high school). Solid lines represent shares of women in
the different categories for the 1960 cohort that I observe in the data. Dashed lines represent simulation results for
the 1960 cohort.
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Other Pre-set Parameters I set the discount factor to 0.98 as in Voena (2015)
and Reynoso (2019). I estimate the childcare costs from the Survey of Income and
Program Participation (SIPP) dataset. I use data from Wave 9 (year 1993) to obtain
childcare costs for women working part time and full time. In my model, I consider
childcare expenditures for children under four years old, which is the definition I use
of infant. Data from SIPP is reported for childcare expenditures for children under
five years.
The wages of the husband are estimated from the data. The husband’s log hourly
wages are a function of education and age. The husband can have low education (high
school or less) or high education (more than high school). The term εit represents
measurement error.

h
h
h
ln with = α1,Ed
+ α2,Ed
age + α3,Ed
age2 + εit

(1.7)

Table 1.14 in Section 1.8.1 gives the estimates for the wage equation parameters
for each type of husband.

1.5.2

Parameters Estimated Inside the Model

After inputting the estimates obtained outside the model, I proceed to estimate the
remaining 49 parameters: 27 parameters for the utility function, ten human capital
process parameters, eight wage parameters, three parameters related to unobserved
heterogeneity in the taste for work, and the scale parameter of the extreme valuedistributed occupational taste shocks.
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Identification
The identification of the parameters in the model relies on the close relationship
between each parameter and the behavior of women in the model. I construct 125
moments that aggregate individual behavior and have a counterpart in the data:
shares of women out of work, in part-time work, and full-time work by age and
marital status; shares across occupations; shares working part time and full time
by number of children; shares with different children by age and marital status;
wage moments; mean skill requirements while working and after periods of nonwork; mean wage increase with cognitive and social complementarities; mean wage
increase controlling for part-time work, full-time work, and experience in the previous
period, and transitions.
I provide ‘heuristic’ identification arguments for the parameters in the model.
As I observe a worker’s initial skills, the skill requirements of an occupation, and
experience, identification of the wage parameters is assured. Cognitive and social
skills accumulation parameters are pinned down by analyzing how much wages grow
with the interaction of worker’s skills and the skill requirements of the occupation,
as this interaction is fundamental for skill formation, itself an input in wages. Skill
depreciation parameters are identified by the comparison of average cognitive and
social occupation skill requirements of women at work with those who came back
to work after a period of non-employment (in Equation 1.3 skills depreciate only
for those who are not working, as there is no accumulation). I pin down experience
accumulation parameters by studying how much wages vary with experience growth,
and with part-time and full-time employment in the previous period for different
stages in the life-cycle.
Choices are made conditional on exogenous and predetermined variables. There-
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fore, the proportions of women in each labor supply choice, in each occupation type,
and with different numbers of children, will identify the parameters of the utility
function. The distribution of types for taste for work, and the differences in utility
parameters by type, are identified by the differences in choices made by women who
are identical in terms of observable characteristics.20 The scale parameter of the
occupation taste shock is pinned down by transition rates across occupations.
Finally, to have a better understanding of which moments are most important to
explain the estimates, I follow Andrews, Gentzkow, and Shapiro (2017) and Reynoso
(2019) and study the sensitivity of parameter estimates to estimation moments.21

Method of Simulated Moments
I estimate the model using the method of simulated moments (McFadden (1989),
Pakes and Pollard (1989)). For any vector of parameters, I simulate the model to
produce a vector of 125 moments described above momsim .22 These moments have
a data counterpart momdata . I use both a global and a local algorithm to search for
parameter estimates. More formally, I need to find a vector of parameters θ such
that I minimize the criterion function:

θSM M = arg min(momsim (θ) − momdata )0 W −1 (momsim (θ) − momdata )

(1.8)

The matrix W is the weighting matrix, a diagonal matrix where the diagonal
elements are bootstrapped sample variances of the N = 125 sample moments.

20

An extension of this model would include unobserved taste for occupations. I could identify
the share of people of each type by using data on occupation aspirations asked at the beginning of
their working lives from NLSY79.
21
0
0
|Sensitivity| = |[Dm
W Dm ]Dm
W |. Results are available upon request.
22
I perform 4300 simulations.
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1.5.3

Results

Parameter Estimates
In this section I report the estimation results for the cohort born in the 1960s.
Table 1.5, Table 1.6 and Table 1.7 give the estimates of the preference parameters,
human capital accumulation parameters, wage parameters and their standard errors.
The latter are calculated using the usual sandwich matrix.23 Table 1.5 reports that
the direct flow utility from part-time and full-time work is negative, where parttime work inflicts the smallest disutility. The utility cost of working is higher for
single women, and this is consistent with the fact that childless women have similar
employment rates across marital status. Utility from children is positive, but it
decreases with the number of children. It also differs by marital status, where married
women have the greatest utility. This is consistent with the fact that single women
are less likely to have children. The parameters for occupation taste suggest that
in order to match occupational sorting moments between real and simulated data,
there has to be a high cost for working in professional occupations and a great benefit
from working in services and clerical jobs. It is important to highlight that preference
parameters will remain fixed for counterfactual exercises.
Table 1.6 shows estimated human capital parameters. Depreciation rates for both
cognitive and social skills are small, but cognitive skills accumulate substantially over
the life-cycle. In contrast, social skills have a very stable evolution, as noted in Lise
and Postel-Vinay (2020). Experience accumulation is high for full-time work in the
first stage of the life-cycle (ages 24-31), and double the experience accumulation for

23

the
estimated
parameters
is
V ar
=
0
where Dm
is a 49*125 matrix of partial derivatives of moment conditions with respect to each parameter and S is the covariance matrix of data
moments.
The

variance

matrix

of

0
0
0
[Dm
W Dm ]−1 Dm
W SW 0 Dm [Dm
W Dm ]−1 ,
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Table 1.5: Estimated Utility Parameters
Description
Part-Time
Full-Time
Part-Time*1 Child
Part-Time*2 Children
Part-Time*3 Children
Full-Time*1 Child
Full-Time*2 Children
Full-Time*3 Children
Part-Time
Full-Time
Part-Time*1 Child
Part-Time*2 Children
Part-Time*3 Children
Full-Time*1 Child
Full-Time*2 Children
Full-Time*3 Children
Part-Time, Type I
Part-Time, Type I
1 Child
2 Children
3 Children
1 Child
2 Children
3 Children
Manager/Professional
Health/Education
Services
Clerical
Science
Proportion Worker Type I (high disutility)
Scale Occupation Taste Shock

Marital Status

Symbol

Married
Married
Married
Married
Married
Married
Married
Married
Single
Single
Single
Single
Single
Single
Single
Single
–
–
Married
Married
Married
Single
Single
Single
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

γ1P T,mar,ω=2
γ1F T,mar,ω=2
γ2P T,mar,n=1
γ2P T,mar,n=2
γ2P T,mar,n=3
γ2F T,mar,n=1
γ2F T,mar,n=2
γ2F T,mar,n=3
γ1P T,sin,ω=2
γ1F T,sin,ω=2
γ2P T,sin,n=1
γ2P T,sin,n=2
γ2P T,sin,n=3
γ2F T,sin,n=1
γ2F T,sin,n=2
γ2F T,sin,n=3
ω=1
ω=1
γ3mar,n=1
γ3mar,n=2
γ3mar,n=3
γ3sin,n=1
γ3sin,n=2
γ3sin,n=3
γ1o
γ2o
γ3o
γ4o
γ5o
–
ν

Estimate
-177.17
-326.22
-5.00
-2.95
2.98
-5.02
-6.97
1.00
-217.85
-427.78
-1.99
-2.01
2.107
-5.01
-7.02
7.98
-92.74
-239.39
279.43
302.11
302.64
34.44
19.95
15.02
-30.72
125.03
165.49
162.95
77.27
0.47
9.70

Standard
Error
6.79
10.96
5.41
2.66
3.17
5.90
0.83
1.55
8.52
10.99
3.73
2.93
6.04
36.2
10.56
12.19
8.25
25.46
3.36
5.84
5.51
7.91
10.54
9.16
4.62
6.14
6.28
6.41
6.07
0.01
0.97

Note: Description explains which parameter of the utility function is reported. Marital Status signals which parameters are marital status dependent. Symbol indicates the parameter symbol in the utility function. The superscripts
P T and F T indicate part-time and full-time work; mar married and sin single; n number of children; ω preference
for labor supply; and o occupation. Estimate indicates the point estimates for each parameter in the utility function.
Standard errors are constructed with numerical gradient methods with a step-size equal to 1% of the parameter
estimate value. I estimate the values for part-time and full-time unobserved cost in work for Type I and normalize
to zero those for Type II.
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Table 1.6: Estimated Human Capital Process Parameters
Description
xc
xs
xc
Accumulation
xs
PT, 24-31
PT, 32-39
PT, 40-45
Accumulation e
FT, 24-31
FT, 32-39
FT, 40-45
Depreciation

Symbol
δc
δs
γc
γs
g(age,PT)
g(age,PT)
g(age,PT)
g(age,FT)
g(age,FT)
g(age,FT)

Estimate
0.0024
0.0018
0.0694
0.0030
1.12
0.25
0.25
2.14
0.49
0.46

Standard Error
0.00019
0.00053
0.020
0.004
0.12
0.08
0.28
0.18
0.14
0.77

Notes: Description explains which parameter of the human capital accumulation process is reported. Cognitive and
social skills are represented by xc and xs , and experience by e. Symbol indicates the parameter symbol in the skills
or experience accumulation functions. The subscripts s and c indicate social and cognitive skills; age the age groups
[28-31], [32-39] and [40-45]; and P T and F T part-time and full-time work. Estimate indicates the point estimates for
each parameter in the skills and experience accumulation functions. Standard errors are constructed with numerical
gradient methods with a step-size equal to 1% of the parameter estimate value.

part-time work.
The wage parameters reported in Table 1.7 mirror the results from empirical
wage regressions in Table 1.4.24 The contributions of social and cognitive skills and
occupational skill requirements to wages is positive, but it is higher in the cognitive
dimension. The mismatch in the cognitive dimension is also negative, incentivizing
workers to choose jobs which skill requirements are close to their own skills.

24

Although similar, these are not the same. The reason is that the empirical wage regressions
shown consider women in ages 24-36 (to make them comparable across cohorts) and the wage
parameters of the model consider women in ages 24-45.
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Table 1.7: Wage Parameters
Description
Symbol
Constant
α1
Cognitive Skills
α2c
Social Skills
α2s
Cognitive Requirements
α3c
Social Requirements
α3s
Mismatch cognitive
α4c
Mismatch social
α4s
Experience
α5

Estimate Standard Error
1.62
0.019
0.34
0.022
0.18
0.017
0.79
0.035
0.50
0.039
-0.22
0.039
0.02
0.017
0.18
0.015

Note: Description explains which parameter of the wage function is reported. Symbol indicates the parameter
symbol in the wage function. The subscripts s and c indicate social and cognitive skills. Estimate indicates the
point estimates for each parameter in the wage function. Standard errors are constructed with numerical gradient
methods with a step-size equal to 1% of the parameter estimate value.

Model Fit
Table 1.8 shows that the model performs well in fitting the shares of women out
of work and in full-time work. The model also fits well the labor supply choices of
married and single women. However, the model somewhat overpredicts a little the
share of women in full-time work at the beginning of their working lives. Table 1.9
reports the fit for occupational choices and Table 1.10 the fit for the choice of children
for women of different ages. Overall, the model does a good job at predicting the
share of women across occupations. It underpredicts the share of childless women at
the beginning of working life. Overall, it captures the timing of fertility over the life
cycle very well.
The model also fits well moments initially not targeted, such as the marital wage
gap, comparing wages of husband and wife. Table 1.11 shows the gender wage gap
for all married women, those married to low educated husbands (LE) and those
married to highly educated husbands (HE). Given that I did not specifically target
wages by marital status in the estimation, the model is able to replicate the data
moments very well. The average wage gap for married women in the data is 80%;
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Table 1.8: Goodness of fit - Labor Supply
Description
24-27
28-31
32-35
36-39
40-43
44-46
Single
Married

Out of Work
Data Std. Err.
0.201
0.0013
0.217
0.0013
0.215
0.0013
0.198
0.0014
0.179
0.0013
0.167
0.0014
0.119
0.0008
0.236
0.0007

Full-time
Out of Work Full-time
Data Std. Err.
Simulated Data
0.567
0.0057
0.201
0.627
0.517
0.0023
0.207
0.575
0.487
0.0016
0.239
0.540
0.487
0.0017
0.187
0.520
0.525
0.0017
0.147
0.506
0.542
0.0018
0.125
0.503
0.663
0.0014
0.105
0.696
0.446
0.0009
0.235
0.449

Note: Data indicates moments calculated from the sample of women in the 1960 cohort (CPS data). Std. Err
reports bootstrapped standard errors for the data moments. Simulated Data shows the same moments from the
sample simulated from the model.

Table 1.9: Goodness of fit - Occupation
Occupation
Manager/Professional
Health/Education
Services
Clerical
Science

Data
0.180
0.350
0.156
0.227
0.067

Std. Err.
0.0008
0.0011
0.0008
0.0009
0.0006

Simulated Data
0.189
0.355
0.156
0.227
0.072

Note: Data indicates moments calculated from the sample of women in the 1960 cohort (CPS data). Std. Err
reports bootstrapped standard errors for the data moments. Simulated Data shows the same moments from the
sample simulated from the model.

and the model produces a gap of 78%. It also captures differences in the wage gaps
when considering education: a larger wage gap exists when the husband has high
education and a lower gap exists when the husband has low education.

1.6

Accounting for Key Changes

The goal of this section is to measure the impact of two forces, changes in the labor
market and changes in family formation, on the increase in women’s participation
in managerial, professional, education, and health-related jobs, on the increase in
full-time work by women, and on the increase in the number of women who remain
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Table 1.10: Goodness of fit - Children
Age

No
Data
24-31
0.580
32-35
0.341
36-39
0.267
40-43
0.247
44-46
0.244
Single
0.765
Married 0.249

Children
S.E. Sim.
0.016 0.465
0.016 0.385
0.015 0.342
0.016 0.320
0.010 0.315
0.011 0.627
0.008 0.216

1 Child
Data S.E.
0.200 0.012
0.206 0.013
0.185 0.013
0.179 0.014
0.172 0.008
0.104 0.009
0.238 0.008

Sim.
0.229
0.182
0.162
0.153
0.148
0.155
0.197

2 Children
Data S.E. Sim.
0.155 0.012 0.221
0.292 0.015 0.274
0.342 0.016 0.305
0.352 0.016 0.328
0.354 0.017 0.336
0.085 0.012 0.138
0.333 0.005 0.381

3 Children
Data S.E. Sim.
0.061 0.012 0.079
0.161 0.014 0.158
0.206 0.014 0.189
0.221 0.015 0.197
0.230 0.013 0.199
0.045 0.013 0.078
0.179 0.005 0.205

Note: Data indicates moments calculated from the sample of women in the 1960 cohort (NLSY79 data). S.E. reports
bootstrapped standard errors for the data moments. Sim shows the same moments from the sample simulated from
the model.

Table 1.11: Marital Wage Gap
Description
Data
All Married
80%
Married to LE Husband 91%
Married to HE Husband 68%

Sim
78%
95%
67%

Note: Data indicates moments calculated from the sample of women of the 1960 cohort (NLSY79 data). Sim shows
the same moments from the sample simulated from the model. LE indicates a low educated husband and HE a high
educated husband.

childless by their mid-thirties.
Throughout this section I will present ‘benchmark’ results, which are labor supply,
occupation and fertility choices predicted by the estimated model for the 1960 cohort.
The simulations use the estimated parameters for the utility function and human
capital accumulation process. In the counterfactuals, I will then allow for sequential
changes in the initial distribution of skills and skill requirements, wage returns to
different skills and skill requirements, transitions into and out of marriage, initial
number of children and initial marital status.
The first counterfactual analyzes the contribution of changes in the wage structure, also accounting for changes in the initial distribution of workers’ skills and in
occupational skill requirements across cohorts. It keeps the initial number of children
and marriage probabilities over the life-cycle unchanged. This exercise measures the

35

contribution of the labor market channel. The second counterfactual evaluates the
contribution of changes in marital status and number of children at the beginning
of the working life, as well as changes in the marriage probability over the life-cycle
across cohorts. It keeps the cognitive and social skills of women, skill requirements
of occupations, and the wage structure unchanged. In this case, I measure the contribution of the family formation channel. As a final exercise, I evaluate the joint
contribution of the two channels taken together in explaining changes in women’s
behavior.

1.6.1

Labor Market Channel

The question I want to answer with the first counterfactual is: To what degree are the
key empirical changes due to changes in the wage structure, accounting for changes in
the workers’ initial skills and in occupational skill requirements across cohorts? I will
disentangle the importance of each subcomponent when answering this question. In
the counterfactual exercises, I set the model wage parameters so that the simulated
wage regression parameters match the empirical regression parameters from Column
(4) in Table 1.4 for the 1980 cohort, and the initial workers’ skills and occupational
skill requirements match those of the 1980 cohort.
The first outcome I study is occupational sorting. The wage evidence in Table 1.4
shows that the return to cognitive skill requirements increased from 0.73 to 1.27, and
the return to social skill requirements increased from 0.43 to 1.25. This suggests that
there are incentives to switch to occupations that are cognitive and socially intensive,
such as managerial, professional, education and health-related jobs. This is what we
observe in the first two columns of Table 1.12, which reports summary statistics from
the data. The first column shows the share of women across occupations for the 1960
cohort and the second column for the 1980 cohort. There is an increase in the share
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of women in managerial and professional occupations (from 17% to 20%) and in
health and education-related occupations (from 34% to 42%). At the same time,
women leave clerical jobs, which have lower cognitive and social skill requirements
(from 23% to 16%).
My model produces interesting results. In the third column, under the heading
‘Estimation Benchmark’, I report simulated moments for the estimated model for
the 1960 cohort. In the fourth column, under the heading ‘Labor Market’, I show
the share of women across occupations when I apply this first counterfactual scenario. It has a very high predictive power, as the share of women in managerial
and professional jobs increases to 25.5% and in health and education to 45%. These
shares are extremely close to the 1980 data, where 20% of women were in managerial
and professional occupations and 42% in health and education jobs. This counterfactual also captures the decrease in employment in clerical jobs to 15%, very close
to the 16% observed in the data. Although I overpredict the share of women in
managerial, professional, health and education-related jobs, the results suggest that
this counterfactual has an almost perfect fit for the purposes of occupational sorting.
In order to illuminate the contribution of each subcomponent of this counterfactual, I evaluate the response to changes in the wage structure, keeping the skill
requirements of occupations and workers’ skill requirements at the 1960 level. In
this scenario, there is a huge increase of workers into health jobs, reaching 70%,
leaving science and clerical jobs with very few women. Once I allow for occupational
skill requirements to have the 1980 distribution, results resemble data patterns. The
reason behind this change is that mean social skill requirements increased in science
jobs and mean cognitive skill requirements increased in clerical jobs. As a result, the
second factor (changes in distributions) counterbalances the strong effect from the
first factor (changes in the wage structure). In a third step, I modify the distribution
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Table 1.12: Share of Women across Occupations - Counterfactual Results

Occupation

Manager/Professionals
Health/Education
Services
Clerical
Science

Data
Cohort
1960
(1)
17%
34%
17%
23%
7%

Counterfactuals
Data
Estimation Labor
All
Cohort
Family
Benchmark Market
Channels
1980
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
20%
18.9%
25.5%
20.8%
28.8%
42%
35.5%
45%
36%
42.4%
17%
15.6%
5.6%
14.7%
5.5%
16%
22.7%
15.2%
21%
14.7%
6%
7.2%
8.7%
7.5%
8.6%

Note: Data Cohort 1960 indicates the share of women across occupations calculated from the sample of women of the
1960 cohort (Source: CPS). In a similar way, Data Cohort 1980 indicates data moments for the 1980 cohort (Source:
CPS). Estimation Benchmark reports the share of women across occupations from simulated data, using estimated
parameters for the 1960 cohort. Counterfactual Labor Market reports the share of women across occupations with
the 1980 cohort’s wage structure, workers’ skills and occupational skill requirements. Counterfactual Family reports
the same simulated moments with the 1980 cohort’s marriage probabilities over the life-cycle, initial distribution of
children and initial marital status. Counterfactual All Channels reports the same simulated moments incorporating
Counterfactual Labor Market and Counterfactual Family together.

of workers’ skills so that it matches that from the 1980 cohort. It is important to
remember that although workers’ skills are measured in percentile ranks, the correlations between cognitive and social skills could change over time, potentially leading
to different results. I observe little impact of the shift in workers’ skills distribution
on occupational choice.25
I report the changes in full-time work and fertility under this counterfactual in
Table 1.13. The first column of this table shows the share of women in full-time work,
with no children and with two children in different age groups for the 1960 cohort.
In the second column, I report the percentage change between the data moments
of the 1980 cohort and the 1960 cohort. In the third column, I show the simulated
moments for the estimated model for the 1960 cohort, and in the fourth column the
percentage change between the counterfactual moments and benchmark simulated
moments.
The first panel documents the results for full-time work. Column (4) shows that
25

Results from counterfactuals switching off each of the three subcomponents (wages, occupations’ skill requirements and workers’ skills) are available upon request.
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the share of women in full-time work under this counterfactual increased in comparison to the ‘Estimation Benchmark’, as the percentage change is around 10%
for all age groups. Therefore, this counterfactual explains, on average, 56% of the
changes in full-time employment.26 In order to understand the mechanisms behind
this change in behavior, I perform the following exercise: I keep the 1960 distribution
of workers’ skills and I set the wage structure and skill requirements of occupations
to the values of the 1980 cohort. This is a useful exercise, given that changing the
distribution of workers’ skills didn’t affect occupational sorting.27 I observe that
among women who change labor supply behavior and move into full-time work, approximately 80% are changing occupations and moving into managerial, professional,
health and education-related jobs. Women in these occupations have higher wages
and therefore incentives to work full time. Another channel that contributes to the
changes in labor supply is the increase in returns to experience, from 0.037 to 0.041
in the wage regression (Table 1.4).
I also focus on fertility outcomes, especially at ages 36-39, where I observe the
most important changes in the data across cohorts. This counterfactual generates an
increase in the share of women with no children of 7.5% and a decrease in the share
of women with two children of 5.4%. It explains 25% of the overall change in the
share of women with no children and 25% of the change in the share of women with
two children in this age group. To understand the mechanisms behind this decision,
I perform the same exercise as with full-time work, changing the wage structure and
occupational skill requirements, and keeping the distribution of workers’ skills fixed.
I find that more than 30% of women who decide to be childless are increasing the
number of hours of work. This is consistent with the fact that in the model it is
26

This is the result of the division of the percentage change I observe in simulation exercises and
the percentage change I observe in data moments. Column (4) divided by Column (2).
27
Keeping the workers’ skills fixed allows identifying the workers who have incentives to switch
behavior when I perform counterfactual exercises.
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more costly to work longer hours if one has children. In addition, I find that the
change in fertility we observe in Column (4) is mainly driven by women who change
occupations towards managerial, professional, health and education-related jobs.
Table 1.13: Labor Supply and Fertility - Counterfactual Results

Age

24-27
28-31
32-35
36-39
32-35
36-39
32-35
36-39

Counterfactuals
% Change
% Change
% Change
Data
Estimation
% Change
Data
Labor
All
Cohort 1960
Benchmark
Family
1960 - 1980
Market
Channels
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Share of Women in Full-time Work
55.7%
9.5%
62.7%
9.3%
3.5%
12.9%
51.6%
15.3%
57.5%
10.1%
3.6%
13.5%
48.7%
21.1%
54%
10%
2%
13.1%
48.7%
25.2%
51.9%
10.5%
3.5%
13.2%
Share of Women with no children
34.1%
14.3%
38.5%
6.2%
12.6%
20.4%
26.8%
30.5%
34.2%
7.5%
15.7%
24.7%
Share of Women with 2 children
29.2%
-13.7%
27.3%
-6.3%
-13.2%
-20.7%
34.2%
-21.6%
30.5%
-5.4%
-11%
-18.3%

Note: Data Cohort 1960 indicates data moments calculated from the sample of women of the 1960 cohort. % Change
Data 1960-1980 shows the percentage change between the data moments of the 1960 and 1980 cohorts. Estimation
Benchmark reports moments from simulated data, using estimated parameters for the 1960 cohort. % Change Labor
Market shows the percentage change between the Estimation Benchmark and the results from a counterfactual with
the 1980 cohort’s wage structure, workers’ skills and occupational skill requirements. % Change Family shows the
percentage change between the Estimation Benchmark and the results from a counterfactual with the 1980 cohort’s
marriage probabilities over the life-cycle, initial distribution of children and initial marital status. % Change All
Channels shows the percentage change between the Estimation Benchmark and the results from a counterfactual
with the Labor Market and Family channels.

1.6.2

Family channel

In this subsection, the aim is to explain the degree to which key empirical changes are
due to changes in marriage probabilities over the life cycle, in the initial distribution
of children and in the initial marital status across cohorts. As shown in Figure 1.3,
women born in the 1960s were more likely to be married, both to highly educated
and low educated husbands, than their counterparts from the 1980s. I estimate the
probabilities of a partner arriving and leaving by age for the 1980 cohort using a
logistic regression. In addition, at the initial age in the model’s life cycle, the share
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of women with no children was 52% for the 1960 cohort, in comparison to 57% for
the 1980 cohort.
The results of occupational sorting appear in Column (5) of Table 1.12 under
the heading ‘Family’. This counterfactual has little predictive power for the changes
in occupation choices of women across cohorts. It seems that the main driver is
the variation in the wage structure, which in this counterfactual is kept constant.
Changes in family formation do affect women’s decisions regarding labor supply,
reported in Column (5) of Table 1.13. In this case, we observe an increase in fulltime work of 3.5% among all age groups, which represents 18% of the overall change
we observe in the data. The changes in marital status across cohorts increase the
proportion of single women, which translates into different consumption equivalence
scales at the household level. In this particular model, it would imply a reduction
from a scale of 2 to 1.4 if a woman is a mother and from 1.6 to 1 if a woman does not
have children. In both cases, although preferences for work change slightly across
marital status, women have an incentive to move towards more hours of work.28
Regarding fertility decisions, the results are displayed in Column (5) of Table 1.13
in the second and third panels. This counterfactual generates an increase in the share
of childless women in the age group 36-39 of 15.7%, which represents 51% of the total
variation observed in the data. In addition, it generates a fall in the share of women
with two children in the same age group of 11%, which is around 50% of the observed
change between the 1960 and 1980 cohorts. The change in behavior is promoted by
the change in the consumption equivalents, as the decision to have a child is more
expensive when one is single.29 In addition, there is a link between labor supply and
28

I am working on an extension of this model where I allow the utility from consumption to
interact with each of the work choices. If there is a negative interaction between the utility from
consumption and labor supply, as in Edwards (2014), a smaller income due to a husband’s absence
will lead to an increase in labor supply. My estimates, in the current case, would underestimate
the potential explanatory power of the family channel.
29
The variation in eq if the woman is single is from 1.4 to 1 (child vs. no child) and if the woman
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fertility choices, as working longer hours and having children is more expensive. In
this counterfactual exercise, I look at those individuals in simulations who changed
fertility behavior and I find that over 70% of those who decide to not have children
are working longer hours.
I am aware that some of the results, in particular fertility patterns, may be
affected by the initial distribution of children, which changes across cohorts. And
given that fertility is an endogenous choice, the initial distribution can be affected
by changes in labor market dynamics or marital status over time. Hence, I perform a
counterfactual where I vary the probabilities of a partner arriving and leaving by age
and initial marital status, but I keep the 1960 cohort’s initial distribution of children.
The changes in fertility patterns over time are almost the same as in Column (5) of
Table 1.13, where, for example, the share of women aged 36-39 with two children
declines by 9% (in comparison to 11% under the full counterfactual).30

1.6.3

Labor Market and Family Channels Taken Together

In this subsection, I report the results from incorporating the two channels. This
involves introducing changes across cohorts in the wage structure, in workers’ initial
skills, in skill requirements of occupations, in marriage probabilities over the life
cycle, in the initial distribution of children, and in the initial marital status.
The results for occupational sorting are displayed in Column (6) of Table 1.12.
Although I over predict the share of women in manager, professional, health and
education-related jobs, I am able to explain the main patterns in the data. By
comparing the results from Columns (4), (5) and (6), it is clear that the main driver
of the changes in occupational sorting is the labor market, with few changes arising
is married is from 2 to 1.6 (child vs. no child).
30
Results from this counterfactual where I keep the initial distribution of children fixed at the
values of the 1960 cohort are available upon request.
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from family formation. Looking at full-time work results in Column (6) of Table 1.13,
the channels taken together are able to generate an increase in full-time work, which
represents on average 74% of the overall variation observed in the data. Both labor
market and family forces are important in explaining full-time work changes, but the
former has a higher impact.
Regarding fertility patterns, I find that at the ages of 36 to 39, this counterfactual
explains 81% of the increase in the share of women who are childless and 85% of the
change in the share of women with two children across cohorts. Comparing Columns
(4) and (5) in Table 1.12, we notice that the family channel plays a more important
role in fertility choices than the labor market one.

1.7

Conclusion

In this paper, I develop a life-cycle model to explain the changes in highly educated
women’s labor market and fertility behavior across cohorts. The model includes three
key choices: labor supply, occupation, and fertility. I estimate the model for the 1960
cohort and analyze the relative contribution of two forces to explain the patterns in
the data. The first force is a change in the labor market, which incorporates changes
in the wage structure, in the initial distribution of workers’ skills and in the skill
requirements of occupations across cohorts. The second force involves changes in
family formation, which includes changes in marriage probabilities over the life cycle,
in the initial distribution of children and in initial marital status across cohorts. I
call these forces ‘Labor market’ and ‘Family’, respectively.
I find that the labor market channel has a large impact on occupation and
full-time work choices. More concretely, this channel explains almost perfectly the
changes in occupational sorting, which involve the increase in the share of women
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employed in managerial, professional, health and education-related jobs and the decrease in their involvement in clerical jobs. It also explains 56% of the changes in
full-time employment, arising from changes in occupational choice and the increase
in the returns to experience. This channel also explains 25% of the increase in the
share of women with no children across cohorts.
The family channel has a large impact on the decision to have children and on
labor supply, but has negligible effects on occupational sorting. It explains 18% of the
observed increase in full-time work across cohorts, 51% of the increase in the share
of women who have no children, and 50% of the decrease in the share of women with
two children.
Overall, both channels are needed to explain the observed changes. Although
these two forces overpredict the increase in employment in managerial, professional,
health and education-related jobs, the direction of the change and magnitudes are
very aligned with observed changes. In addition, together they explain 74% of the
increase in full-time work, 81% of the increase in the share of women with no children,
and 85% of the decrease in the share of women with two children. Hence, these two
forces are necessary to explain the changes in behavior between the 1960 and 1980
cohorts.
Throughout my analysis I keep preferences fixed across cohorts, so it may be
possible that the unexplained share of change in behavior could be explained by
other factors such as changes in social norms. There is a growing number of papers
that highlight the importance of social norms in labor supply decisions (Fernández,
Fogli, and Olivetti (2004), Fernández (2013), Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan (2015),
Goussé, Jacquemet, and Robin (2017)) that I could introduce through changes in
preferences for labor supply across cohorts.31 Another extension of my model would
31

NLSY79 and NLSY79 Young Adults provide eight statements that address attitudes on gender
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include an endogenous decision of marriage, within an equilibrium life-cycle model
as in Chiappori, Dias, and Meghir (2018) and Reynoso (2019). Such changes in the
structure of wages across cohorts may have implications for family formation that
were beyond the scope of the current paper, but that could explain changing marriage
patterns. In addition, a future avenue of research could incorporate equilibrium in
both the labor market and the marriage market within a life-cycle framework.

roles regarding employment. Women need to indicate whether they agree or disagree with them.
These include, among others, that the place for a woman is the home and not an office, that a wife
who has full family responsibilities does not have time for outside employment and that women are
much happier if they stay home taking care of children. Labor supply decisions would depend on
social norms in an extended version of this model.
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1.8
1.8.1

Appendix
Labor Supply and Wages of Men
Figure 1.6: Labor Supply of Highly Educated Men

Note: CPS data. Employment and Full-time work of highly educated men, for 1956-1960 and 1980-1984 cohorts.
Full-time workers are defined as those individuals working more than 35 hours per week.
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Figure 1.7: Occupational Choices of Highly Educated Men

Note: CPS data. Employment and Full-time work of highly educated men, for 1956-1960 and 1980-1984 cohorts.
Full-time workers are defined as those individuals working more than 35 hours per week.
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Table 1.14: Regression of Husband’s ln Wages by Education Level
(1)
>HS
0.152∗∗∗
(0.0165)

(2)
<=HS
0.077∗∗∗
(0.0132)

-0.002∗∗∗
(0.000250)

-0.001∗∗∗
(0.000199)

Constant

0.0882
(0.291)

1.252∗∗∗
(0.234)

N

15,056

18,844

Age
Age sq.

Note: Data from NLSY79. The dependent variable is ln wages of husbands. Wages are in 2016 constant dollars, and
I trim values of the real hourly wage that are below 3 and above 200. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

1.8.2

Female Wages
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49
15868

2.351∗∗∗
(0.0219)

15765

2.484∗∗∗
(0.0256)

0.411∗∗∗
(0.0359)
0.143∗∗∗
(0.0344)

0.485∗∗∗
(0.0329)
0.200∗∗∗
(0.0335)

14989

1.528∗∗∗
(0.0414)

0.507∗∗∗
(0.0556)
0.165∗∗∗
(0.0520)
0.639∗∗∗
(0.0677)
0.489∗∗∗
(0.0629)
-0.320∗∗∗
(0.101)
0.0363
(0.0881)
0.0376∗∗∗
(0.00155)

(3)
Cohort 1960

15302

1.031∗∗∗
(0.0640)

0.381∗∗∗
(0.0582)
0.170∗∗∗
(0.0586)
1.145∗∗∗
(0.0822)
1.167∗∗∗
(0.0861)
-0.250∗∗
(0.109)
-0.157
(0.102)
0.0406∗∗∗
(0.00178)

(4)
Cohort 1980

14989

0.0377∗∗∗
(0.00191)
-0.542∗
(0.290)
-0.224
(0.226)
0.141
(0.231)
-0.0208
(0.194)
1.443∗∗∗
(0.0484)

0.459∗∗∗
(0.101)
0.150
(0.0958)
0.732∗∗∗
(0.125)
0.597∗∗∗
(0.123)

(5)
Cohort 1960

15302

0.0402∗∗∗
(0.00201)
-0.566∗∗
(0.286)
-0.0199
(0.188)
0.0652
(0.252)
-0.238
(0.227)
0.946∗∗∗
(0.0716)

0.352∗∗∗
(0.0980)
0.0345
(0.102)
1.174∗∗∗
(0.128)
1.439∗∗∗
(0.136)

(6)
Cohort 1980

Note: Data from NLSY79 and NLSY97. Columns (1) and (2) report coefficients of a regression of ln wages on cognitive and social skills, for cohorts 1960 and 1980.
Columns (3) and (4) include in the regression cognitive and social skill requirements, experience, and mismatch for overqualification. The latter is a variable that is 0 for
underqualification and xc − yc for overqualification in the cognitive dimension. Analogous for social skills. Columns (5) and (6) report results from a regression where I
include social and cognitive skills and skill requirements, experience, and mismatch for over- and underqualification in a quadratic manner. Wages are in 2016 constant
dollars, and I trim values of the real hourly wage that are below 3 and above 200. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Observations

Constant

min{xs − ys 0}2

max{xs − ys , 0}2

min{xc − yc , 0}2

max{xc − yc , 0}2

Experience

Overqualified Soc. xc − yc

Overqualified Cog. xc − yc

Social Requirement ys

Cognitive Requirement yc

Social Skills xs

Cognitive Skills xc

(2)
Cohort 1980

(1)
Cohort 1960

Table 1.15: Regression of Female ln Wages

1.8.3

Principal Component Analysis

In this section, I report results from the principal component analysis. I take the
first principal component for the cognitive and social dimensions. In the case of
the cognitive dimension, the first component explains 64% and 63% of the total
variance for the 1960 and 1980 cohorts, respectively. In the social dimension, the
first component explains 70% and 66%, respectively. I now report the loadings for
each of the descriptors included in the analysis.
Table 1.16: Loadings for O*NET descriptors
Description
Mathematical Reasoning
Number Facility
Memorization
Reading Comprehension
Mathematics
Social Perceptiveness
Contact with others
Assisting and caring for others
Service orientation
Personal Services

Cohort 1960
0.618
0.592
0.156
0.245
0.503
0.485
-0.125
0.571
0.464
0.454

Notes: O*NET data. Loadings from principal component analysis.
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Cohort 1980
0.597
0.527
0.143
0.277
0.517
0.492
-0.155
0.565
0.461
0.448

1.8.4

List and Description of Moments
Table 1.17: List and description of moments

Description

Conditioning
Work choices and dynamics of labor supply
% in FT, Out of Work
Age, Marital Status
% in each occupation
–
% in FT, Out of Work
Number of Children, Marital Status
% in FT, Out of Work
Infant Kid, Marital Status
Fertility
% women with 0,1,2 and 3 children
Age
% women with 0,1,2 and 3 children
Marital Status
Wages
Mean of ln wages
Age
Coeff. of ln wage regression
–
Human Capital Accumulation
Mean wage increase from t to t + 1
xt y t
Mean wage increase from t to t + 1
FT & PT in t
Mean wage increase from t to t + 1
experience in t
Mean y
working & after period not working
Transitions
PT, FT, Out of Work
–
Occupations
–

Count
16
5
18
6
24
8
6
8
2
8
8
4
11
5

Note: (i) Age is grouped into six bands [24-27], [28-31], [32-35], [36-39], [40-43], [44-46]; (ii) x denotes worker skills
and y occupational skill requirements; (iii) data from CPS and NLSY79.
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1.8.5

Goodness of fit

In this section I report the goodness of fit for moments targeted in the estimation.
Table 1.18: Goodness of fit: Mean ln Wages
Description
24-27
28-31
32-35
36-39
40-43
44-46

Data
2.62
2.85
2.90
2.99
3.01
2.79

ln Wages
S.E. Sim. Data
0.012
2.63
0.011
2.82
0.015
2.89
0.017
2.88
0.021
2.89
0.024
2.92

Note: Data indicates moments calculated from the sample of women in the 1960 cohort (NLSY79 data). S.E. reports
bootstrapped standard errors for the data moments. Sim. Data shows the same moments from the sample simulated
from the model.

Table 1.19: Goodness of fit: Regression ln Wages
Description
xc
xs
yc
ys
|xc − yc |
|xs − ys |
Experience
Constant

Regression ln Wages
Data S.E. Sim. Data
0.33 0.041
0.31
0.16 0.035
0.18
0.73 0.034
0.81
0.43 0.056
0.45
-0.17 0.057
-0.16
0.007 0.060
0.002
0.038 0.048
0.04
1.66 0.009
1.65

Note: Data indicates moments calculated from the sample of women in the 1960 cohort (NLSY79 data). S.E. reports
bootstrapped standard errors for the data moments. Sim. Data shows the same moments from the sample simulated
from the model.
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Table 1.20: Goodness of fit: Human Capital Accumulation
Description
Reg. ln wages on ln exp (1st diff.)
Mean wage increase if FT in t − 1
Mean wage increase if PT in t − 1
Mean yc if working
Mean yc after period out of work
Mean ys if working
Mean ys after period out of work
Mean wage increase with xc yc in t − 1
Mean wage increase with xs ys in t − 1

Human Capital Accumulation
Data S.E.
Sim. Data
0.28
0.014
0.31
0.043 0.0052
0.049
0.033 0.0116
0.036
0.49
0.005
0.51
0.46
0.009
0.50
0.49
0.005
0.54
0.49
0.012
0.52
0.13
0.011
0.08
0.09
0.016
0.11

Note: Data indicates moments calculated from the sample of women in the 1960 cohort (NLSY79 data). S.E. reports
bootstrapped standard errors for the data moments. Sim. Data shows the same moments from the sample simulated
from the model.

Table 1.21: Goodness of fit: Transitions
Description
Out of Work - Employed
Employed - Out of Work
Man/Prof (stayer)
Health (stayer)
Services (stayer)
Clerical (stayer)
Science (stayer)

Data
0.39
0.12
0.63
0.58
0.82
0.57
0.65

Transitions
S.E. Sim. Data
0.009
0.26
0.004
0.07
0.014
0.83
0.032
0.27
0.008
0.62
0.012
0.29
0.011
0.37

Note: Data indicates moments calculated from the sample of women in the 1960 cohort (NLSY79 data). S.E. reports
bootstrapped standard errors for the data moments. Sim. Data shows the same moments from the sample simulated
from the model.
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Table 1.22: Goodness of fit: Children and Labor Supply
Description
Out of Work - 1 Child
FT - 1 Child
Out of Work - 2 Children
FT - 2 Children
Out of Work - 3 Children
FT - 3 Children

Transitions
Data S.E. Sim. Data
0.28 0.015
0.26
0.52 0.018
0.46
0.39 0.016
0.38
0.35 0.018
0.31
0.39 0.026
0.21
0.34 0.024
0.60

Note: Data indicates moments calculated from the sample of women in the 1960 cohort (NLSY79 data). S.E. reports
bootstrapped standard errors for the data moments. Sim. Data shows the same moments from the sample simulated
from the model.
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Chapter 2
Women, Fertility and Informality
(Joint with Lucas Finamor and Boryana Ilieva)1

2.1

Introduction

Recent empirical literature provides solid evidence on the relationship between female
labor market outcomes, gender norms and fertility decisions. Women are more likely
to drop out of the labor force after the birth of the first child, work part-time,
and move to self-employment (Blau and Kahn (2007), Lim (2017), Kuziemko, Pan,
Shen, and Washington (2018), Kleven, Landais, Posch, Steinhauer, and Zweimüller
(2019a), Kleven, Landais, and Søgaard (2019b), Berniell, Berniell, De la Mata, Edo,
and Marchionni (2021)). In addition, the event of childbirth is also highly correlated
with the widening of the gender wage gap (Goldin, 2014).
Much of the evidence comes from developed and high income countries, but less
is known about the relationship between fertility and labor market outcomes in developing countries (Cruces and Galiani (2007), Agüero and Marks (2008), Berniell,
1

This research uses information from the Social Protection Survey (Encuesta de Protección
Social). We thank the Sub-secretary of Social Protection, the intellectual owner of the survey, for
the authorization to use the innominate datset. All the results from this research are responsibility
of the authors and do not correspond to those of the Chilean Sub-secretary of Social Protection.
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Berniell, De la Mata, Edo, and Marchionni (2021)). The labor markets in Latin
American countries differ greatly from high income countries. First, the formal sector is much more rigid, allowing for less flexibility in working arrangements, such as
hours and place of work. Second, informality is widespread. According to Maloney
(2004), between 30% and 70% of the urban work force in Latin American countries is
informal. The definition of informality varies among existing studies, but it usually
subsumes wage earners without a labor contract and other workers with low social
security contributions, such as the self-employed. Informal workers are considerably
more exposed to risk not only because they are in sectors with higher earnings volatility and turnover, but also due to the lack of access to social insurance programs such
as unemployment benefits, disability insurance, pensions, and maternity leave in the
case of women. We use Chile as a case study, because the availability of its rich
data sets allows us to employ panel data and perform event studies as our empirical strategy. Even though informality rates in Chile are lower than in other Latin
American countries, our results could be informative for developing countries with
similar labor market characteristics. Finally, formal childcare is still largely unavailable (Mateo Dı́az and Rodriguez-Chamussy, 2016), so the presence of children can
be expected to have a strong effect on the labor supply of women in the household.
In this paper, we distinguish three sectors of employment: formal, informal and
self-employment. We define a formal worker as one that has a defined labor contract.
A written labor contract protects against unexpected events like unemployment and
ensures benefits such as social security and labor union participation rights. An
informal worker, however, is not in possession of such a contract and a self-employed
individual works independently. We show that these sectors differ in hours of work,
workplace flexibility, wages, firm size, and occupation composition.
We begin our event studies analysis by documenting well-known facts, such as
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the fall in labor force participation and wages of women after the birth of the first
child, in comparison to men (Kuziemko, Pan, Shen, and Washington (2018), Kleven,
Landais, Posch, Steinhauer, and Zweimüller (2019a), Kleven, Landais, and Søgaard
(2019b), Berniell, Berniell, De la Mata, Edo, and Marchionni (2021)). We evaluate
whether occupational sorting is behind the fall in wages of women after childbirth.
We find that there is a positive association between cognitive skill requirements and
wages and that there is a fall in the cognitive skill requirements of the occupations
in which women are employed after childbirth.2 We also analyze the choice of sector
of employment. As in previous literature, we find that there is a fall in formal work.3
We bring insights into the choice of informal work and self-employment. We find
that there are no significant changes in the share workers in the informal sector after
childbirth for both men and women. In addition, we find that women are more likely
to switch into self-employment after childbirth and that the effect is larger for highly
educated women (those that have more than high school education). Overall, we
observe a decrease in formal work, no changes in informal work and an increase in
self-employment, all conditional on employment. These results are exactly aligned
with the degree of flexibility of these sectors, where formal work and self-employment
are at the opposite ends of the spectrum. We also observe that flexible arrangements
differ by education level: while highly educated women are more likely to work
remotely and keep their hours of work unchanged after childbirth, lower educated
women remain working at the firm and reduce their hours of work.
In addition, we analyze insurance decisions of men and women regarding pension
2

Cognitive skill requirements are measured as required cognitive tasks at the occupational level.
More details in Section 2.3.
3
Our definition of informal employment considers workers who do not have a labor contract
and differs from other definitions in the literature. More concretely, Berniell, Berniell, De la Mata,
Edo, and Marchionni (2021) consider workers who share at least one of these characteristics: do
not contribute to social security, do not have a labor contract, are self-employed and low-educated,
and have temporary jobs.
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contributions and type of health coverage. We observe a fall in female contributions
to the pension system relative to men, where married women experience the largest
fall. This different behavior by marital status may have long-run welfare implications
in the case of divorce. In relation to health coverage, we find that women are less
likely to keep private insurance after childbirth, while men experience no effects.
This may be related to poorer economic conditions, as women are more likely to
leave the labor force after childbirth.
In a final exercise, we explore the effects of the 2008 Chilean pension system reform, which aimed to decrease the gender gap in pensions in two ways: (i) through
government coverage of women’s pension contribution for each child born alive (an
amount of 10% of 18 minimum wages) and (ii) in case of divorce, a judge can determine that a spouse keeps up to 50% of the other spouse’s pension funds accumulated
during marriage. We study the impact of the reform on formal employment and
observe that women who had children after the reform are less likely to leave formal
employment, in comparison to those who had children before 2008.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.2 we summarize the main findings
in the literature and our main contribution. In Section 2.3 we introduce the data
sets and display important descriptive statistics of the sample. In Section 2.4 we
introduce our empirical strategy. In Section 2.5 we present our results. In the final
section we conclude.

2.2

Related Literature and Contribution

This paper contributes to three strands of the literature: (i) research on gender gaps
in the labor market and their determinants, (ii) studies on informality and choice of
sectors of employment, and (iii) work that explores the effects of the 2008 Chilean
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pension system reform.
Several studies have documented that the gender wage gap in developed countries
has decreased over the period 1970-1990, but its closing has had a slower rate in the
last three decades (Goldin (2006), Blau and Kahn (2006), Blau and Kahn (2007),
Blau and Kahn (2017)). The narrowing of the gap has been mainly driven by an
increase in human capital accumulation and labor market attachment among females,
as well as by a decrease in occupational segregation by gender (Blau and Kahn, 2017).
As children remain the primary reason for women to change career plans and are
a major driver of the gender wage gap (Goldin (2006), Correll, Benard, and Paik
(2007), Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz (2010)), our paper studies gender gaps in labor
market outcomes and insurance decisions around the time of childbirth focusing on
a developing context.
Like previous related literature (Kuziemko, Pan, Shen, and Washington (2018),
Kleven, Landais, Posch, Steinhauer, and Zweimüller (2019a), Kleven, Landais, and
Søgaard (2019b), Berniell, Berniell, De la Mata, Edo, and Marchionni (2021)), we
use an event study approach to study the gender gaps around the time of childbirth.4
These papers find that there is an increase in the gender gap in earnings, a decrease
in labor force participation and wages of mothers relative to fathers, and that many
of these effects are persistent. We investigate if the wage decrease after childbirth
is related to different occupational choices. More concretely, we study the cognitive
content of occupations in which women are employed before and after childbirth.
This paper also relates to studies that analyze how workers choose sectors of
employment, especially in developing countries (Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2019),
Dix-Carneiro, Goldberg, Meghir, and Ulyssea (2019), Berniell, Berniell, De la Mata,
4

In reference to methodology, our paper addresses the issues of non-convex weighting when
using two-way fixed effect estimators in event studies with varying treatment timing, typically not
addressed in the literature, by following the method implemented in Sun and Abraham (2020).
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Edo, and Marchionni (2021), Ponczek and Ulyssea (2020)). Our paper distinguishes
multiple characteristics of each job and classifies individuals as formally employed,
informally employed, or self-employed — three coexisting types of employment typically found in developing countries. We define formal workers as individuals in
possession of a defined labor contract. A written labor contract protects against
unexpected events such as lay-offs on short notice and ensures entitlement to benefits such as social security and labor union participation rights. Informal workers,
in contrast, are not in possession of such a labor contract. Self-employed individuals work independently. In the context of developing countries, accounting for
self-employment is important since a nontrivial fraction of the working population
has neither a formal nor an informal employer. Jobs in these three sectors of employment also differ in characteristics, such as hours and place of work, ‘firm’ size,
wages, cognitive skill requirements and the share of people that contributes to the
pension system. The percentage of individuals that contribute to the pension system
is above 98% in the formal sector, around 20% in the informal sector and 16% for
those in self-employment. Contrary to other approaches in the existing literature,
we acknowledge that workers could contribute to the pension system while being
self-employed or working without a labor contract.
As we measure different characteristics of jobs, which include hours of work and
work location, we contribute to the literature on child penalties and the search of
flexible work arrangements (Golden (2001), Golden (2008), Goldin and Katz (2011),
Edwards (2014), Goldin (2014)). While there is significant literature studying the
choice of part-time work, we bring a less explored dimension, which is workplace
flexibility. In the Chilean context, the formal sector is the most rigid, where more
than 80% of women work at the establishment. The informal sector is still very
inflexible in place of work, as around 40% of women work at the firm. In self-
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employment, however, less than 20% of workers work at the firm site.
While clearly related in spirit, the recent paper by Berniell, Berniell, De la Mata,
Edo, and Marchionni (2021) differs from ours in several ways. First, their definition
of informality differs from ours, subsuming workers in at least one of the following
categories: not contributing to social security, low-skilled in self-employment, working with no labor contract and having a temporary job.5 Second, we consider selfemployment as a different sector of employment, as it is characterized, for example,
by different work arrangements and wage distribution. Third, we study occupational
sorting, workplace flexibility, health insurance, the effects of the pension reform,
among other outcomes, not addressed in their paper.6
We further analyze gender gaps in health and social security insurance after the
birth of the first child. While there is some evidence that women are less likely
to contribute to the pension system after the event of childbirth (Subsecretarı́a de
Previsión Social (2015), Amarante, Colacce, and Manzi (2017), Berniell, Berniell,
De la Mata, Edo, and Marchionni (2021)), we additionally explore differences by
marital status, providing insights on the source of the pension gender gap. On the
health dimension, we study whether women differently change their health insurance
rates and association with a private health care provider after childbirth.
Finally, we study the implications of the 2008 pension system reform on labor
force participation and formal employment of men and women in Chile. We perform
event studies on men and women who gave birth before and after 2008 to study
the effects of the reform, complementing the existing literature exploring the effects
of the reform on pension wealth, formal employment, pension contributions, among
other outcomes (Attanasio, Meghir, and Otero (2011), Behrman, Calderon, Mitchell,
5

In a previous version of their paper, they considered an informal worker an individual who did
not contribute to the social security system.
6
Their paper differs from ours as well in methodology and sample selection, as ours considers
individuals who became parents between 1981 and 2016 and theirs between 2002 and 2015.
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Vasquez, and Bravo (2011), Todd and Joubert (2013)).

2.3

Data and Institutional Setting

Our main dataset is a longitudinal survey from Chile, “Encuesta de Protección Social” (EPS).7 The survey has six waves (2002, 2004, 2006, 2009, 2012 and 2015)
and contains, among others, information on demographics, family structure, health,
earnings, employment, and wealth, where almost 35,000 individuals are interviewed.8
Labor market spells are characterized by information on the contractual relationship,
firm size, hours of work, occupation and industry. Historical information dating back
to 1980 is obtained in the first interview. In each survey wave, labor market information and changes in the family structure since the last interview are recorded.
Information on other variables, such as wealth, is available only for the years in
which individuals were surveyed. Wages are available for all spells from the year
2002 onward and detailed labor market trajectories can be reconstructed for the majority of the workers. The resulting 35-year panel allows us to analyze the allocation
of the labor force in different sectors of employment and its relation to a child arrival, conditional on various socio-demographic characteristics. Since this data can
be linked to the administrative data on the Pension System in Chile, “Historia Previsional de Afiliados” (HPA), on some occasions, we use the administrative records
to minimize measurement error.
In addition to the above data sets, we use the Occupation and Information Network data set (O*NET) to build a measure of cognitive skill requirement of occupations.9 This data set contains information on a wide array of requirements at the
7

Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, Survey EPS.
Since the second wave, the EPS is a nationally representative survey of the Chilean population.
9
This data set is developed under the sponsorship of the U.S. Department of Labor/Employment
and Training Administration.
8
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occupational level, such as abilities, knowledge, skills, and work styles. We use 18
descriptors of core cognitive tasks, perform principal component analysis and keep
the first principal component as a measure of cognitive skill requirements at the
occupational level. We normalize the score to be in the interval [0,1].

2.3.1

Sample

For the purpose of this study, we consider the time period 1981-2016 and individuals
born between 1945 and 1995, aged between 16 and 59.10 As we are interested in
the way in which a child arrival shapes individuals’ careers, we focus on individuals
who become parents at some point during the observation period. Table 2.1 below
presents key descriptive statistics of our sample of interest, which contains 6,729
mothers and 6,045 fathers. We observe that around two thirds of women have a
high school degree at most, while the remaining third has a higher education level
(some college, college degree or more). In the case of men, around 30% have higher
education. We also explore family related statistics, and report that 75.6% of women
and 86.3% of men were married at childbirth. The average age at first birth is around
23 and 25 for women and men, respectively. Individuals can be observed for around
25 years on average.

2.3.2

Labor Market Characteristics

In Table 2.2 we present a summary of the information related to the labor market.
We converted the spell information to a monthly panel given that this is the most
desegregated information from the spell reporting.11 We report working hours and
wages after removing the highest and lowest 2% of observations. We observe that
men work more hours than women, 48.4 weekly hours versus 45, respectively. Wage
10

We limited the maximum age to 59 because 60 is the legal retirement age for women in Chile.
As we discuss in section 2.4, the event studies will use monthly data but the event dummies
are coded annually.
11
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Statistic

N

Mean

St. Dev.

Panel A — Women
Cohort
6,729 1974
Less than high school
6,729 0.140
High school degree
6,729 0.526
More than high school
6,729 0.334
Marital status
6,729 0.756
Age at birth of first child 6,729 23.801
Years observed
6,729 24.859

11.892
0.347
0.499
0.472
0.429
5.081
10.078

Panel B — Men
Cohort
6,045 1 971
Less than high school
6,045 0.178
High school degree
6,045 0.534
More than high school
6,045 0.289
Marital status
6,045 0.863
Age at birth of first child 6,045 25.541
Years observed
6,045 26.860

11.775
0.382
0.499
0.453
0.344
5.285
9.449

Note: Data from EPS. Cohorts born between 1945 and 1995, individuals ages 16 and 59. Columns report Number
of Observations (N), Mean and Standard Deviation (St.Dev.). Panel A presents the statistics for Women and Panel
B for Men.

information is reported as the logarithm of monthly wages in Chilean UFs, which
corresponds to, approximately, 40 USD. Wages for men in the sample are higher than
wages for women. On average, the wage measure for women is 2.38, while the male
average stands at 2.61.
Table 2.2 further summarizes the rates of labor force participation, employment
in different sectors as well as ratios of employment by type of working arrangement.
Average labor force participation is 57% for women and 88.8% for men. Unemployment rates are higher among females: only 4.5% of men are unemployed while 8%
of women are unemployed. Employed individuals work in four main sectors: the
public sector, the formal sector, the informal sector, and self-employment. Informal
workers are those that work for private firms but report that they do not have a
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signed labor contract. Self-employed individuals are those that declare to work independently (cuenta propria). Following these definitions, participation of men in the
formal sector conditional on participation is 59%, in the informal sector is 8% and in
self-employment is 16%. Among women the corresponding statistics are 48%, 12%,
and 9%, respectively.12
Conditioning on labor force participation, 70% of women and 64% of men work
at the firm. Finally, we observe that both women and men contribute to the pension
system at low rates, 31% and 53%, respectively.

2.3.3

Sectors of Employment

To complete the presentation of the data, we highlight important differences across
sectors of employment. In Figure 2.1 we show characteristics of the formal, informal,
and self-employment sectors: firm size, place of work, pension contributions, cognitive requirements, weekly hours and hourly wages. With the exception of pension
contributions, all figures are generated based on data for women only.
The first panel shows the firm size distribution by sector. Around 60% of women
working in the formal sector are employed in firms with more than 20 employees. In
the informal sector this share falls to approximately 20%, and the typical firm has less
than 10 employees. Self-employment is entirely characterized by small firms, where
more than 70% of self-employed women work in a one-person venture. The second
panel displays the proportion of women by workplace. The majority of women in
the formal sector work at the firm, while only 40% of informal workers and less than
20% of the self-employed do so.
In the third panel we show that around 20% of individuals in the informal sector
12

In Table 2.2, there is an ommited sector ‘other’, such that when we sum this category and the
share of individuals unemployed, in the formal, informal and self-employment sectors, we obtain
the share of individuals who are participating in the labor force.
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Table 2.2: Labor Market Information
Statistic

N

Mean

St. Dev.

Panel A — Women
Pension contribution indicator 1,993,227 0.316
Working hours
728,189 44.984
Log monthly wage
356,597
2.386
Labor force participation
1,575,946 0.570
Unemployed
1,575,946 0.080
Formal sector
1,575,946 0.277
Informal sector
1,575,946 0.067
Self-employed
1,575,946 0.050
Public sector
1,575,946 0.079
Working at the firm facility
637,059
0.699
Cognitive measure
204,857
0.479

0.465
10.094
0.633
0.495
0.271
0.448
0.249
0.218
0.270
0.459
0.228

Panel B
Pension contribution indicator
Working hours
Log monthly wage
Labor force participation
Unemployed
Formal sector
Informal sector
Self-employed
Public sector
Working at the firm facility
Cognitive measure

0.499
8.730
0.596
0.315
0.209
0.499
0.271
0.353
0.224
0.481
0.162

— Men
1,943,062
1,249,947
533,201
1,563,162
1,563,162
1,563,162
1,563,162
1,563,162
1,563,162
1,139,399
294,468

0.530
48.437
2.609
0.888
0.046
0.524
0.080
0.146
0.053
0.636
0.497

Note: Data from EPS and O*NET. Cohorts born between 1945 and 1995. For the labor market outcomes observations
are restricted to individuals between 16 and 59 years old and for years between 1981 and 2016.
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Figure 2.1: Characteristics of Sectors of Employment

Note: Data from EPS 2002-2015. All individuals born between 1945 and 1995, ages between 16 and 59. With the
exception of the third panel, all graphs restrict to the sample of women only. The first panel shows the proportion
of women by firm size and the second panel by workplace across sectors of employment. The third panel displays
the proportion of individuals contributing to the pension system. The fourth panel shows the average cognitive
requirements, the fifth panel the distribution of weekly hours and the sixth panel the flipped CDF for hourly wage
in terms of the minimum wage, in all cases across sectors of employment.

and in self-employment contribute to the pension system. In panel four, we summarize the mean cognitive requirements of occupations associated with each employment
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scenario and find that the demand for cognitive requirements is highest in the formal
sector. In terms of working hours, the formal sector has typical contracts of 45 or 48
hours, and other working arrangements are much less common. For the informal and
self-employment sectors there is higher dispersion, especially for self-employment.
The last panel shows the wage distributions (cumulative density functions) across
sectors. Around 40% of self-employed and informally employed women are earning
less than the minimum wage.13 The formal sector cumulative distribution function
stochastically dominates the other two, except at the top wages. The findings from
Figure 2.1 let us conclude that informality and self-employment are associated with
lower levels of social security contributions and higher levels of labor market risk
compared to the formal sector.

2.3.4

Pension System Reform in 2008

In the final part of our analysis we refer to a reform of the pension system that took
place in Chile in 2008. This reform aimed to reduce poverty at older ages and the
number of individuals with low pensions at retirement. The new pension ends the
requirement of a minimum of 20 years of contribution for eligibility to a minimum
pension level, and increases the generosity of pensions through a raise in the minimal
pension level and through the introduction of a bonus with an implicit tax rate of
30%.
Other changes of the reform affect women in particular: 1) the government covers a woman’s pension contribution for each child born alive with an amount that
represents 10% of 18 minimum wages, and 2) at the moment of divorce, a judge can
determine that a spouse keeps up to 50% of the other spouse’s pension funds. The
13

The minimum wage increased in Chile from 100 US dollars at its introduction in the 70s to
almost 400 US dollars in recent years.
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goal of these changes is to reduce the gender gap in pensions received at the time
of retirement. It is not clear, however, which could be the effect of this reform on
women’s incentives to work and to remain in the formal sector. On the one hand, the
coverage of pension contributions by the government increases the pension savings,
so the household needs to work less in the formal sector to obtain the same pension
amount. At the same time, married women who do not work have an increase in
insurance in the case of divorce, potentially receiving up to half of the husband’s
pension funds. This also motivates a decrease in labor supply. On the other hand,
given that women have pension coverage for one and a half years for each child born,
they may have incentives to remain attached to the formal sector and reap a higher
contribution at an older age.

2.4

Empirical Strategy

Our empirical strategy follows an event study approach similar to Kuziemko, Pan,
Shen, and Washington (2018) and Kleven, Landais, and Søgaard (2019b), exploring
time of birth of the first child. The basic model is given by:

Yimt =

8
X

βτ 1{EVimt = τ } +

τ =−5

59
X

γa 1{ageimt = a} + νi + εimt ,

(2.1)

a=16

where i indexes individuals, m calendar-month, and t indexes the calendar year.
Individuals have their first child at calendar year ei , so we construct the event time
as the distance, in years, relative to the birth of the first child, given by:

EVimt =























−5,

if t − ei < −5

t − ei ,

if − 5 ≤ t − ei ≤ 8 ,

8,

if t − ei > 8
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(2.2)

We cap the extreme points, 5 years before and 8 yeas after the first birth, as in
Kuziemko, Pan, Shen, and Washington (2018). In our specification we include as
controls age and individual fixed effects. We estimate the regressions separately for
men and women, using always event year -2 as the comparison level, which is omitted
from Equation 2.1. The choice of the annual level stems from data constrains — for
a high fraction of women in our sample we can only identify the year of first birth,
but not the exact month.14
Recent research by Goodman-Bacon (2018), Callaway and Sant’Anna (2020) and
Sun and Abraham (2020) discusses the issues with non-convex weighting when using
two-way fixed effect estimators in event studies, where there is variation in treatment timing across units and dynamic treatment effects. We follow Sun and Abraham (2020) and estimate the parameters of interest, βτ , without the contamination
effects from other periods. As we show in our results section, our estimates point
in the direction of dynamic treatment effects for several outcomes, which may pose
challenges for papers using two-way fixed effects in the context of childbirth event
studies. The estimator, however, constraints the treatment effect to be homogeneous
across different cohorts, a hypothesis that it is strong in our setting.15
We restrict our sample to individuals that have at least one child — therefore,
we do not explore selection into becoming a parent. Our identification hypothesis
is that the pre-birth outcomes are exogenous to the birth of the first child. Our
approach allows for some anticipatory behavior, requiring only that for a non empty
set of pre-birth years this anticipatory behavior is non-existent. We do confirm this
intuition showing that pre-birth estimates are centered around zero for both men
and women.
14

Additionally, the computational burden of the estimator of Sun and Abraham (2020) is substantially higher with the monthly specification.
15
We define a “cohort” as a group of women that have their first birth in a particular age.
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The outcome variable varies in each exercise, including indicator variables for
labor force participation, employment in specific sectors (formal, informal and selfemployment) and place of work, among others. The coefficient βτ captures the
difference of average Yit , τ years apart from the birth of the first child in comparison
with two years before the event, conditional on age, and individual fixed effects. Our
identification strategy explores, therefore, individual level variation in the timing
of births — estimating within-individual evolution of outcomes. In most of our
graphs we show the coefficient of interest βτ from Equation 2.1 as a percentage of
the counterfactual outcome, when we exclude the contribution of the event dummies
as in Kleven, Landais, and Søgaard (2019b).

2.5
2.5.1

Results
Labor Supply, Wages and Occupations

We begin our analysis by showing the evolution of labor supply choices and wages
before and after the event of the birth of the first child. Figure 2.2 shows the event
study coefficients from Equation 2.1 as a percentage of the counterfactual outcome.
Two years before the birth of the first child (τ = −2), 54% of women and 82% of men
are working. The labor force participation (LFP) rates of men and women diverge
further two years after the birth: there is a reduction in labor force participation
of approximately 40% for women, but there are no effects for men with respect to
τ = −2. This initial decline experienced by women is persistent over time. We
also report results for low and highly educated individuals, and observe that low
educated women are more likely to leave the labor force than highly educated women
(a year after the first birth, there is an approximate decrease of over 40% and around
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20% with respect to τ = −2, respectively). Our estimates mirror the results from
the existing literature, being close to US and UK estimates, but larger than the
ones from Scandinavian countries (Kuziemko, Pan, Shen, and Washington (2018),
Kleven, Landais, Posch, Steinhauer, and Zweimüller (2019a), Kleven, Landais, and
Søgaard (2019b), Berniell, Berniell, De la Mata, Edo, and Marchionni (2021)).16 In
addition, we show heterogeneity by marital status, previously unexplored in related
event studies. We find that married women experience an approximate decline of
40% in LFP and single women around 25% a year after the birth, relative to τ = −2.
The difference by marital status may arise due to social norms, insurance, or due
to the fact that the income of the partner contributes to joint family resources in
such a way that employment in the presence of a child and a husband becomes less
desirable.
Regarding hourly wages, Figure 2.3 shows there is an initial 5% fall for women a
year after the birth, with respect to τ = −2, but this drop becomes more pronounced
over time representing a 20% fall by the sixth year. There are heterogeneous results
by education level, where we observe a fall in hourly wages for highly educated women
but not for low educated women in Panels (b) and (c). The fall in wages for women
with high education may be driven by slower rates of human capital accumulation,
or different commitment to the job in the presence of children. It could further be
driven by the fact that these women switch to lower paying and less demanding jobs.
The stable wage level of low educated women, on the other hand, could be due to
selection: those who remain at work are the most productive, preventing a decrease
in hourly wages.

16

We find that our estimates are larger than in Berniell, Berniell, De la Mata, Edo, and Marchionni (2021) that find a decrease in LFP of 15% after childbirth. This may be due to different
sample selection and empirical strategy.
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Figure 2.2: Labor Supply

(a) LFP: All

(b) LFP: LE

(d) LFP: Single

(c) LFP: HE

(e) LFP: Married

Note: Each graph plots the βτ coefficients from Equation 2.1 as a percentage of the counterfactual outcome, together
with 95% confidence intervals. The baseline coefficient is set at period -2. Numbers in parenthesis display the
outcome variable level in the reference period and numbers in brackets the number of individuals in each analysis.
LE stands for Low Educated and HE for highly educated. The outcome variable is a binary variable which equals
1 when the individual is in the labor force. Panel (a) uses the full samples, while panels (b)-(e) use sub-samples,
respectively: low educated (high school or less), highly educated (some college or more), single and married.
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Figure 2.3: Hourly Wages

(a) Wages: All

(b) Wages: LE

(c) Wages: HE

Note: Each graph plots the βτ coefficients from Equation 2.1 together with the 95% confidence intervals. The
baseline coefficient is set at period -2. Numbers in parenthesis display the outcome variable level in the reference
period and numbers in brackets the number of individuals in each analysis. LE stands for Low Educated and HE for
highly educated. The outcome variable is the hourly wages. Panel (a) uses the full samples, while panels (b)-(c) for
sub-samples, respectively: low educated (high school or less) and highly educated (some college or more). Results
by marital status are available upon request.

To better understand the reason for the fall in wages after childbirth we perform
an event study where we analyze if women move towards occupations that have
lower wages. We proceed in two steps. First, we show that women move towards
occupations with lower cognitive content. Second, we report a positive correlation
between wages and cognitive content at the occupational level. In the first step,
we classify occupations by their cognitive task requirements, where we consider core
math, analytical and verbal skills. We sort the occupations on a unit interval [0,1],
where 1 represents the occupation with the highest cognitive content. Figure 2.4
shows that there is about a 10% decrease in cognitive tasks performed at the job
a year after the event of motherhood and a decrease of almost 30% by the sixth
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year, with respect to τ = −2. In the second step, we compute the mean wages
at the occupational level. With information on cognitive skill requirements for 207
occupations, we graph the relation between wages and cognitive skill requirements in
Figure 2.5, where we report a positive relation. This suggests that as women move
towards less cognitive occupations after birth, they are more likely to move towards
jobs with lower wages.
Figure 2.4: Occupation Cognitive Requirements

Note: The graph plots the βτ coefficients from Equation 2.1 as a percentage of the counterfactual outcome, together
with 95% confidence intervals. The baseline coefficient is set at period -2. Numbers in parenthesis display the
outcome variable level in the reference period and numbers in brackets the number of individuals in each analysis.
The outcome variable is the average cognitive measure of the occupation.
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Figure 2.5: Correlation Wages and Cognitive Skill Requirements at Occupational
level

Note: Data from EPS and O*NET. The sample includes 207 occupations. The cognitive skill requirement is obtained
performing principal component analysis on 18 descriptors of cognitive task requirements. We keep the first principal
component and normalize the measure on the interval [0,1].

2.5.2

Sector of Employment

We also study the effects of parenthood on sector of employment, distinguishing
between three sectors: formal, informal and self-employment. These sectors differ
in the degree of flexibility, as depicted in Figure 2.1. The formal sector is the most
rigid, where the majority of employees typically work 48 hours and the usual place
of work is the firm. The informal sector is more flexible than the formal sector in
the hours dimension, but still very inflexible on the workplace dimension as around
40% of the employees work at the firm. Self-employment offers the most flexible
work arrangements, as is evident from the histogram of hours worked - which is
very smooth over the range of working hours - and from the fact that over 50% of
individuals who are self-employed work from home.
We start the analysis with formal employment. We observe in panel (a) of Figure
2.6 that, conditional on working, women decrease employment in the formal sector
after the birth of the first child. A year after the birth, there is a 13% decrease in
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formal employment for women, with respect to τ = −2. In contrast, men increase
their participation in formal employment by 3% in the first year after birth. Figure
2.14 reports the results unconditional on working, where we observe a decrease in
employment for women in the formal sector of 50% a year after the first birth with
respect to τ = −2. This strong decline in formal employment may be driving the fall
in labor force participation. We report heterogeneous results by education level on
panels (b) and (c) of Figure 2.6. Low educated women decrease formal work by 17%
and highly educated women by 8%. Figure 2.14 in Section 2.7 shows that the fall
in formal employment (unconditional on working) for low educated women is above
70% while for highly educated women above 30% in the years after childbirth. This
large difference may explain the larger fall in labor force participation of low educated
women shown in Figure 2.2. Panels (d) and (e) show that the formal employment
response of single and married women is very similar.
We now turn to the results on informal work. Our study distinguishes formal from
informal work by the existence of a formal contract of employment. We understand
that a labor contract for a determined time period, establishing rights and obligations
of the worker, determines a working formal relation. This contract protects the
worker from unexpected events such as unemployment, and provides with benefits
such as social security and labor union participation (Dı́az and Gálvez, 2015). We
observe that for those individuals who are working under a formal contract in our
sample, 98% of them are contributing to the pension system. For informal workers,
we find that only 23% are contributing to the pension system.17 Therefore, workers
can be under an informal contract in the private sector and still contribute to the
pension system. We observe in panel (a) of Figure 2.7 that there are no significant
changes in informal work for men and women after the birth of the first child. There
17

Own calculations based on self-reported pension contributions from EPS data.
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are also no significant changes for low and highly educated women (panels (b) and
(c)) nor for single or married women (panels (d) and (e)). If we analyze the results
unconditional on employment, we observe in panels (b) and (c) of Figure 2.15 in
Section 2.7 that there is a fall of 40% in informal employment a year after the birth
of the first child for both low and highly educated women. However, low educated
women experience a persistent effect that lasts many years after the birth. This fall is
consistent with a larger fall in labor force participation among low educated women
that is persistent after childbirth. Our results on informal employment differ from
Berniell, Berniell, De la Mata, Edo, and Marchionni (2021) because we consider a
different definition of informality, as described on Section 2.2, and employ different
samples and methodology.
Finally, we report results on self-employment conditional on employment in Figure 2.8. In panel (a) we observe that there is an increase of above 60%, with respect
to τ = −2, on the probability of being self-employed for women while there are no
effects for men. This effect is persistent and increasing, reaching a 100% by the 6th
year after the birth of the first child. We also show results by education level on panels
(b) and (c). A year after the birth, low educated women increase self-employment by
around 60% while highly educated women by a 100%. Appendix Figure 2.16 shows
that, unconditional on employment, the increase in self-employment after childbirth
is driven almost entirely by highly educated women.
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Figure 2.6: Formal Employment - Conditional on Working

(a) Formal: All

(b) Formal: LE

(d) Formal: Single

(c) Formal: HE

(e) Formal: Married

Note: Each graph plots the βτ coefficients from Equation 2.1 as a percentage of the counterfactual outcome, together
with 95% confidence intervals. The baseline coefficient is set at period -2. Numbers in parenthesis display the
outcome variable level in the reference period and numbers in brackets the number of individuals in each analysis.
LE stands for Low Educated and HE for highly educated. The outcome variable is a dummy variable for formal
employment. Panel (a) uses the full samples, while panels (b)-(e) for sub-samples, respectively: low educated (high
school or less), highly educated (some college or more), single and married.
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Figure 2.7: Informal Employment - Conditional on Working

(a) Informal: All

(b) Informal: LE

(d) Informal: Single

(c) Informal: HE

(e) Informal: Married

Note: Each graph plots the βτ coefficients from Equation 2.1 as a percentage of the counterfactual outcome, together
with 95% confidence intervals. The baseline coefficient is set at period -2. Numbers in parenthesis display the
outcome variable level in the reference period and numbers in brackets the number of individuals in each analysis.
LE stands for Low Educated and HE for highly educated. The outcome variable is a dummy variable for informal
employment. Panel (a) uses the full samples, while panels (b)-(e) for sub-samples, respectively: low educated (high
school or less), highly educated (some college or more), single and married.
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Figure 2.8: Self-Employment - Conditional on Working

(a) Self-Employment: All

(b) Self-Employment: LE

(c) Self-Employment: HE

(d) Self-Employment: Single (e) Self-Employment: Married
Note: Each graph plots the βτ coefficients from Equation 2.1 as a percentage of the counterfactual outcome, together
with 95% confidence intervals. The baseline coefficient is set at period -2. Numbers in parenthesis display the outcome
variable level in the reference period and numbers in brackets the number of individuals in each analysis. LE stands
for Low Educated and HE for Highly Educated. The outcome variable is a dummy variable for self-employment.
Panel (a) uses the full samples, while panels (b)-(e) for sub-samples, respectively: low educated (high school or less),
highly educated (some college or more), single and married.
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2.5.3

Flexible work arrangements

The results from the previous section are very consistent with the fact that women
may try to find work arrangements that are flexible after childbirth. We observe
that the decrease in formal work, the lack of significant changes in informal work
and the increase in self-employment, all conditional on employment, are aligned
with the degree of flexibility of these sectors, where formal and self-employment
are at the opposite ends of the spectrum. We now provide results on how parents
choose hours and place of work after the event of childbirth. While the results on
hours of work (panels (a)-(c) of Figure 2.9) are consistent with findings in related
literature (Kleven, Landais, and Søgaard (2019b), Berniell, Berniell, De la Mata,
Edo, and Marchionni (2021)), we bring new insights into a different dimension of job
flexibility: the place of work. Panel (d) shows that after childbirth women are less
likely to work at the firm while men experience no effects. We observe heterogeneous
effects by education level on the hours and workplace dimensions, as highly educated
women are less likely to work at the firm and experience no change in hours of work
after childbirth. In contrast, low educated women decrease their hours of work and
remain working at the firm. This is potentially related to job flexibility available for
low and highly educated women in self-employment. We observe in the data that
54% of low educated women (high school or less) do not work at the firm, but the
share increases to 71% for those with more than high school education.18

2.5.4

Insurance

One of the objectives of this paper, apart from studying men and women’s labor
market behavior, is to study their insurance decisions, which include pension contributions and health coverage. For individuals in the formal sector, contributions
18

The differences in workplace flexibility in self-employment are also evident for men. The share
of low educated men not working at the firm is 58%, while it is 79% for the highly educated.
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Figure 2.9: Flexible Work Arrangements

(a) Hours: All

(b) Hours: LE

(c) Hours: HE

(d) Workplace: All

(e) Workplace: LE

(f) Workplace: HE

Note: Each graph plots the βτ coefficients from Equation 2.1 as a percentage of the counterfactual outcome, together
with 95% confidence intervals. The baseline coefficient is set at period -2. Numbers in parenthesis display the
outcome variable level in the reference period and numbers in brackets the number of individuals in each analysis.
LE stands for Low Educated and HE for Highly Educated. The outcome variable for panels (a)-(c) are hours of
work and for panels (d)-(f) is a dummy for workplace at the firm site. Panels (a) and (d) use the full sample, panels
(b) and (e) the sub-sample of low educated individuals (high school or less), and panels (c) and (f) highly educated
individuals (some college or more). Results by marital status are available upon request.
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to social security are part of the formal labor contract. However, there may be voluntary contributions from individuals in the informal and self-employment sectors.
In our sample, 23% and 22% of informal and self-employed workers, respectively,
contribute to the pension system. In Panel (a) of Figure 2.10, we report that there
is a decrease in pension contributions above 5% for women in the first year after
childbirth, with respect to τ = −2, while there are no significant changes for men.
This is a persistent fall for women, reaching over 10% by the sixth year after the first
birth. Panels (b) and (c) evidence that the behavior is consistent across education
levels.19 Interestingly, we observe in Panels (d) and (e) that it is married women
who, by the second year after childbirth, experience a decrease of almost 10% in
pension contributions with respect to τ = −2. In the case of single women, the
decrease is of 5% by the same year. Given that married women are more likely to
leave the labor force after childbirth, we explore pension contributions unconditional
on working. Appendix Figure 2.17 shows that married women decrease their contributions by over 40% and single women by 25% a year after childbirth, with respect
to τ = −2. In both cases, pension contributions continuously decrease many years
after childbirth. This different behavior by marital status may have implications in
the long run in the case of divorce, where married women who did not contribute
to the pension system could be adversely affected, especially when married to an
individual without pension funds.20
In relation to health insurance, before childbirth 93% of women and 90% of men
report having health insurance in Chile. Panel (a) in Figure 2.11 reports the effects
of childbirth on access to health coverage, where we observe no significant changes for
19

We also perform this analysis using administrative records of pension contributions instead of
self-reported data. We also find that highly educated women decrease their pension contributions
conditional on working. Results are available upon request.
20
Since 2008, new legislation contemplates the transfer of part of the pension funds to the spouse
that was economically affected during marriage (it is ruled by a judge). It should not exceed 50%
of the accumulated funds during marriage of the spouse that has to contribute.
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neither men and women. In this case, the available data does not allow to follow the
same person monthly before and after birth, as the question about health insurance
is not retrospective in the surveys. Hence, our event studies rely on cross-sectional
data where there is substantial variation in the date of birth of the first child. In
addition, we explore the effects of childbirth on the quality of their health insurance,
given by whether it is public or private. We find that there is a fall of almost a
100% in the share of women with private health coverage a year after childbirth,
while there are no significant effects for men. This may be related to women’s lower
economic conditions, as they are more likely to leave the labor force and experience
lower wages after childbirth.

2.5.5

Pension System Reform in 2008

In this section we analyze the effects of the pension system reform in 2008 in formal
employment and labor supply decisions. We proceed by evaluating the responses of
men and women before and after this reform was implemented. In particular, we
perform event studies for those who had children before and after 2008, while keeping
individuals from the same cohorts in each analysis. In Panel (a) of Figure 2.12, we
report the labor supply responses of individuals who had a child before 2008. In
Panel (b), we report the same outcome for individuals who gave birth after 2008.
We observe that there are no differences in labor supply responses between those
groups. However, Figure 2.13 shows a different picture. We document the responses
in formal work, conditional on employment, for individuals that had children before
2008 (Panel (a)) and after 2008 (Panel (b)). We observe that women who had
children after the reform are more likely to remain in the formal sector after the
birth of the first child, suggesting that the policy encourages formal labor market
attachment.
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Figure 2.10: Pension Contribution

(a) Pension: All

(b) Pension: LE

(d) Pension: Single

(c) Pension: HE

(e) Pension: Married

Note: Each graph plots the βτ coefficients from Equation 2.1 as a percentage of the counterfactual outcome, together
with 95% confidence intervals. The baseline coefficient is set at period -2. Numbers in parenthesis display the
outcome variable level in the reference period and numbers in brackets the number of individuals in each analysis.
LE stands for Low Educated and HE for Highly Educated. The outcome variable is a dummy variable for pension
contribution (self-reported). Panel (a) uses the full samples, while panels (b)-(e) for sub-samples, respectively: low
educated (high school or less), highly educated (some college or more), single and married.

86

Figure 2.11: Health Insurance

(a) No Health Insurance: All

(b) Private Health Insurance: All

Note: Each graph plots the βτ coefficients from Equation 2.1 as a percentage of the counterfactual outcome, together
with 95% confidence intervals. The baseline coefficient is set at period -2. Numbers in parenthesis display the
outcome variable level in the reference period and numbers in brackets the number of individuals in each analysis.
The outcome variables are dummy variables for no health insurance (panel a) and private health insurance (panel
b).
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Figure 2.12: Labor Supply - Pension Reform 2008

(a) Year of Birth Before 2008

(b) Year of Birth After 2008

Note: Each graph plots the βτ coefficients from Equation 2.1 as a percentage of the counterfactual outcome, together
with 95% confidence intervals. The baseline coefficient is set at period -2. Numbers in parenthesis display the
outcome variable level in the reference period and numbers in brackets the number of individuals in each analysis.
The outcome variable is a dummy variable for labor force participation. Panel (a) estimates for the sub-sample of
individuals who gave birth to children before 2008 and panel (b) after 2008.
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Figure 2.13: Formal Employment Conditional on Working - Pension Reform 2008

(a) Year of Birth Before 2008

(b) Year of Birth After 2008

Note: Each graph plots the βτ coefficients from Equation 2.1 as a percentage of the counterfactual outcome, together
with 95% confidence intervals. The baseline coefficient is set at period -2. Numbers in parenthesis display the
outcome variable level in the reference period and numbers in brackets the number of individuals in each analysis.
The outcome variable is a dummy variable for formal employment, conditional on working. Panel (a) estimates for
the sub-sample of individuals who gave birth to children before 2008 and panel (b) after 2008.

2.6

Conclusion

In this paper we analyze the labor market and insurance decisions of men and women
around the time of childbirth in Chile. This is a market with three distinct sectors:
formal, informal and self-employment. A formal worker has a clear labor contract
that protects against unexpected events such as unemployment, and ensures benefits
such as social security and labor union participation rights. An informal worker does
not have such contract and a self-employed individual works independently. These
sectors also differ in hours and place of work, firm size, cognitive tasks, among other
characteristics.
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Using an event studies approach, we find that the fall in women’s wages after
childbirth is associated with their switch into less cognitive occupations, which have
lower wages. In addition, we observe that there is a decrease in formal work, no significant changes in informal work and an increase in self-employment for women after
childbirth. These results are aligned with the degree of flexibility of these sectors,
where formal and self-employment are at opposite ends of the spectrum. Moreover,
women with high education are more likely to work remotely after childbirth, while
low educated women experience no changes on work location. Regarding insurance
choices, we observe a fall in female pension contributions, which is larger for married women, and a fall in female private health insurance after childbirth, while men
experience no effects. In a final exercise, we explore the effects of the 2008 pension
system reform in Chile, which aimed to decrease the gender gap in pensions. We
observe that women who had children after the reform are less likely to leave formal
employment, in comparison to women who had children before 2008.
We expect that our work informs policy makers on the costs associated with labor
market behavior and insurance decisions after childbirth in a country with widespread
informality. Gender gaps, not only in wages and labor market attachment, but also
in occupational sorting, sectors of employment and insurance, may have long-run
welfare implications. Further work should study the effects of policies that aim to
reduce such gaps in the context of developing countries, taking into account the role
of children as a major driver for differential gender behavior.
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2.7

Appendix
Figure 2.14: Formal Employment - Unconditional on Working

(a) Formal: All

(b) Formal: LE

(d) Formal: Single

(c) Formal: HE

(e) Formal: Married

Note: Each graph plots the βτ coefficients from Equation 2.1 as a percentage of the counterfactual outcome, together
with 95% confidence intervals. The baseline coefficient is set at period -2. Numbers in parenthesis display the
outcome variable level in the reference period and numbers in brackets the number of individuals in each analysis.
LE stands for Low Educated and HE for highly educated. The outcome variable is a dummy variable for formal
employment. Panel (a) uses the full samples, while panels (b)-(e) for sub-samples, respectively: low educated (high
school or less), highly educated (some college or more), single and married.
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Figure 2.15: Informal Employment - Unconditional on Working

(a) Informal: All

(b) Informal: LE

(d) Informal: Single

(c) Informal: HE

(e) Informal: Married

Note: Each graph plots the βτ coefficients from Equation 2.1 as a percentage of the counterfactual outcome, together
with 95% confidence intervals. The baseline coefficient is set at period -2. Numbers in parenthesis display the
outcome variable level in the reference period and numbers in brackets the number of individuals in each analysis.
LE stands for Low Educated and HE for highly educated. The outcome variable is a dummy variable for informal
employment. Panel (a) uses the full samples, while panels (b)-(e) for sub-samples, respectively: low educated (high
school or less), highly educated (some college or more), single and married.
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Figure 2.16: Self-Employment - Unconditional on Working

(a) Self-Employment: All

(b) Self-Employment: LE

(c) Self-Employment: HE

(d) Self-Employment: Single (e) Self-Employment: Married
Note: Each graph plots the βτ coefficients from Equation 2.1 as a percentage of the counterfactual outcome, together
with 95% confidence intervals. The baseline coefficient is set at period -2. Numbers in parenthesis display the outcome
variable level in the reference period and numbers in brackets the number of individuals in each analysis. LE stands
for Low Educated and HE for highly educated. The outcome variable is a dummy variable for self-employment.
Panel (a) uses the full samples, while panels (b)-(e) for sub-samples, respectively: low educated (high school or less),
highly educated (some college or more), single and married.
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Figure 2.17: Pension Contribution - Unconditional on working

(a) Pension: All

(b) Pension: LE

(d) Pension: Single

(c) Pension: HE

(e) Pension: Married

Note: Each graph plots the βτ coefficients from Equation 2.1 as a percentage of the counterfactual outcome, together
with 95% confidence intervals. The baseline coefficient is set at period -2. Numbers in parenthesis display the
outcome variable level in the reference period and numbers in brackets the number of individuals in each analysis.
LE stands for Low Educated and HE for Highly Educated. The outcome variable is a dummy variable for pension
contribution (self-reported). Panel (a) uses the full samples, while panels (b)-(e) for sub-samples, respectively: low
educated (high school or less), highly educated (some college or more), single and married.
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Chapter 3
Maternal Mental Health and
Children’s Human Capital
(Joint with Paula Calvo and Zhengren Zhu)

3.1

Introduction

Mental health has become a focal point for public health discussions in the past
decade. According to statistics from the Kaiser Family Foundation, over 30% of
adults in the US report anxiety or depression symptoms, and 20% of them would
need but are not receiving mental health therapy.1 Two crucial characteristics of
mental health disorders motivate this study. First, mental health issues begin early
in a person’s life cycle. In fact, 75% of mental health disorders begin before age
24, and 50% begin before age 14 (Kessler, Berglund, Demler, Jin, Merikangas, and
Walters, 2005). Second, mental health is highly correlated with children’s outcomes
and socioeconomic status (Center on the Developing Child at Harvard University
(2009)). These facts suggest that parents from lower socioeconomic blackgrounds
and with mental health disorders may be more likely to raise children with poor
1

From https://www.kff.org/interactive/mental-health-and-substance-use-state-fact-sheets/
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mental health and lower skills, leading to a vicious cycle of poverty.
This paper proposes a model for the development of children’s human capital,
which subsumes children’s cognitive skills and mental health. We focus on understanding the contribution of maternal mental health on her child’s development, separately from the role of maternal cognitive and non-cognitive skills. The premise is
that mental health is different from other non-cognitive abilities, such as self-esteem
and self-control. In particular, we show that the correlation between maternal mental
health and measures of non-cognitive skills, such as the Rosenberg Scale (self-steem)
and Rotter-Locus Control Scale (self-control) is very low. We build on the rich child
development literature that estimates production functions for children’s human capital development to build our model (Cunha and Heckman (2007), Todd and Wolpin
(2007), Cunha and Heckman (2008), Bernal (2008), Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010), Del Boca, Flinn, and Wiswall (2014), Agostinelli and Wiswall (2016),
Ronda (2017), Attanasio, Cattan, Fitzsimons, Meghir, and Rubio-Codina (2020a),
Attanasio, Meghir, and Nix (2020b)). As in Attanasio, Cattan, Fitzsimons, Meghir,
and Rubio-Codina (2020a) and Ronda (2017), we consider maternal mental health
as a productive input. We differ from the former in that they measure cognitive
and social skills of children when they are 12-24 months old, while we look at longer
term outcomes in adolescence. In reference to the later, the author only focuses
on children’s cognitive skills while we also focus on children’s mental health.2 In
addition, we consider three dimensions of maternal human capital: cognitive skills,
non-cognitive skills and mental health.
This paper is motivated by important empirical patterns that we document using
our data, the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) and the NLSY79
2

In Ronda (2017) he measures child cognitive skills with the Letter-Word module of the
Woodcock-Johnson aptitude test available from PSID. In our paper, we focus on PIAT Math and
Reading Recognition tests available in NLSY79 Children and Young Adult.
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Children and Young adults, which also describe key mechanisms in our model. First,
maternal mental health disorders are positively associated with her child’s mental
health disorders and negatively associated with the child’s cognitive development,
even after controlling for household income, maternal education, mother’s cognitive
and non-cognitive abilities, along with other demographic controls. Second, poor
maternal mental health is associated with worse parenting practices. This suggests
that the interactions between the mother and her child are negatively affected when
the mother has mental health problems, as she provides less emotional support and
cognitive stimulation. Third, poor children’s mental health affects their cognitive
outcomes. These empirical facts have also been documented in the literature linking
parental mental health, their children’s outcomes and parental investments, and correlates of mental health in childhood (Caplan, Cogill, Alexandra, Robson, Katz, and
Kumar (1989), Cummings and Davies (1994), Currie and Stabile (2007), Kiernan
and Huerta (2008), Frank and Meara (2009), Mensah and Kiernan (2010), Mensah and Kiernan (2011), Letourneau, Tramonte, and Willms (2013), Dahlen (2016),
Aizer, Stroud, and Buka (2016), Fitzsimons, Goodman, Kelly, and Smith (2017),
Ronda (2017), Noonan, Burns, and Violato (2018), Persson and Rossin-Slater (2018),
Bendini and Dinarte (2020), Kamis (2020), Baranov, Bhalotra, Biroli, and Maselko
(2020)). Lastly, poor mental health in childhood is related to worse long term outcomes, including poor mental health in adulthood, lower educational attainment
and lower wages. These results are consistent with previous findings in the literature
(Z. Farmer (1993), Currie and Stabile (2007), Smith and Smith (2010), Goodman,
Joyce, and Smith (2011)).
Equipped with these empirical facts, we incorporate them as key mechanisms of
our model. In particular, we consider three channels of how maternal mental health
can affect children. First, through a direct effect on children’s cognitive skills and
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mental health. Second, maternal mental health affects their children’s development
through their ability in providing effective parenting. Third, as maternal mental
health affects children’s mental health, this may in turn affect the children’s cognitive
skills. We describe in detail the steps and the assumptions needed for the estimation
of the structural parameters of our model, following Attanasio, Meghir, and Nix
(2020b). We also suggest ways to control for the endogeneity of parental investments,
to incorporate in later stages of this research.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we
describe the data and empirical patterns related to the role mental health plays
in the intergenerational transmission of socioeconomic status. Section 3.3 presents
the human capital development model we use to synthesize the empirical patterns.
Section 3.4 describes the procedure for estimating the human capital development
model, and Section 3.5 concludes.

3.2
3.2.1

Empirical Evidence
Data

Data for our empirical analysis comes from the sample of young women from the
National Longitudinal Survey of the Youth 1979 (NLSY79) and their children, who
are part of the survey Child and Young Adults (NLSY79 Child/YA). This allows
us to link the mothers with their children, but also to follow these children into
adulthood, which is critical for our inter-generational analysis.
We focus our analysis on the cross-sectional sample of women, which consists of
3,108 individuals who were between 14 and 22 years old when interviewed for the
first time in 1979.3 We match them with their children, who were interviewed since
3

We exclude from the analysis women and their children who are part of the Supplemental
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1986. Moreover, starting in 1994, children aged 15 or older were interviewed with
instruments similar to the ones used with their mothers.
The NLSY79 contains information on household demographics, such as age, education, race, marital status and income. More importantly, it includes information on
cognitive, non-cognitive and mental health dimensions of respondents. The NLSY79
Child/YA contains rich assessments of the children, including test results, parenting
practices, and behavioral problems. In the next subsection, we explain in detail all
the variables we use in our analysis.
For most of the analysis, we use cross-sectional data of the year 1992, when mental
health measures of women were collected for the first time. We limit our attention
to children that were between 3 and 14 years old in that year. To assess long term
outcomes, we augment our sample with information of the same children when they
reach adulthood. These young adults were between 25 and 44 years old when last
interviewed in 2016.

3.2.2

Evidence

The goal of this section is to document empirical patterns observed in the data, that
describe mechanisms we incorporate in our model of children’s human capital accumulation. In particular, we focus on the relation between maternal mental health,
parental investments and children’s outcomes (both cognitive and mental health outcomes). We also document the relation between the child’s own mental health and
their long-term outcomes as young adults, to highlight the importance of the intergenerational transmission of human capital. Before venturing into this objective, we
present evidence that suggests that mental health is different from other dimensions
of human capital, such as cognitive and non-cognitive skills. This fact encourages
Sample, over-sample of relatively disadvantaged individuals and the Military Sample.
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the incorporation of maternal mental health as a different input into the children’s
human capital function.

What is mental health?
Previous studies examining the role of non-cognitive skills, as an input and as a
dimension of human capital, use the term to summarize a set of skills not directly
captured by standardized tests that measure cognitive skills, such as the Armed
Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) (Humphries and Kosse, 2017). The most popular
measures of non-cognitive skills include self-esteem, self-control, behavioral issues
and risk and time preferences, among others. While one may argue that mental
health seems only marginally related to these measures, we provide a formal approach
by exploring the pairwise correlations between our measure of mental health and
measures of cognitive and non-cognitive skills.
We follow the literature that measures non-cognitive skills and include the Rosenberg Scale, which is a measure of self-esteem, and the Rotter-Locus Control Scale,
which measures self-control. We use AFQT as our measure of cognitive skills. To
measure mental health, we use the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Scale (CES-D).4
We standardize all measures to enable comparison.
The results in Table 3.1 suggest that correlations between mental health and
non-cognitive skills range between -0.15 and -0.18. The pairwise correlation between
the different measures of non-cognitive skills is larger in every case. The pairwise
correlation between mental health and cognitive measures is -0.21, which is relatively
low.5 As we observe weak correlations between the mental health measure and
4

A full description of the different scales for mental health, cognitive and non-cognitive measures
can be found in Appendix 3.6.1.
5
In Table 3.8 of Appendix 3.6.2, we explore the correlation between the components of the
mental health measure and non-cognitive skills. Overall, the correlations are very weak. Table 3.9
shows that the correlations between mental health and non-cognitive measures are also low when
we focus on the sample of NLSY79 women’s young adult children. In addition, using data from
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cognitive and non-cognitive skill measures, we consider mental health as an additional
and separate dimension of human capital, departing from previous literature.
Table 3.1: Correlation between Mental Health, Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Measures

CES-D Scale
Rosenberg Scale
Rotter-Locus Control Scale
AFQT

CES-D Scale

Rosenberg Scale

1.000
-0.179
-0.150
-0.213

1.000
0.306
0.293

Rotter-Locus AFQT
Control Scale

1.000
0.310

1.000

Note: NLSY79 data. The sample includes 3,108 women. CES-D Scale is a 7-item depression measure. Rosenberg
Scale is 10-item self-esteem measure. Rotter-Locus Control Scale includes four pairs of measures that capture selfcontrol. AFQT includes arithmetic, word knowledge, paragraph comprehension and numerical operation scores from
the ASVAB test.

Maternal Mental Health and Children Outcomes
In this section we study the intergenerational dimension of mental health. In particular, we examine the role that maternal mental health has on children’s mental
health and on a battery of children’s cognitive outcomes. In addition, we empirically explore mechanisms through which maternal mental health affects children’s
development.
As mentioned above, our main measure of maternal mental health is CES-D.
There is no equivalent measure of mental health for young children. Thus, we use
instead six components of the dichotomous Behavioral Problem Index (BPI), related
to children’s different behaviors: antisocial, anxious, depressive, headstrong, hyperactive, and dependent.6 As a robustness check, in part of the analysis we focus only
the Millennium Cohort Study in the United Kingdom, we find similar results as we observe weak
correlations between mental health, non-cognitive and cognitive measures (not reported here but
available upon request).
6
According to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), mental health disorders
are “serious changes in the way children typically learn, behave or handle their emotions, which
cause distress and problems getting through the day”. Mental health disorders for children include,
but are not limited to, anxiety, behavioral disorders, and attention deficit.
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on the Depression/Anxiety components of the BPI.
We start by looking at the direct effect of maternal mental health on children’s
mental health. To eliminate as many confounding factors as possible, we control for
demographic characteristics that could be correlated with maternal mental health
and also affect our measure of children’s mental health. In particular, all of our
specifications control for the child’s gender and age, maternal race and family income.
Additionally, we control for the years of education of the mother and her marital
status. We restrict most of our analysis to children in the age group of five to 14
years old.
Table 3.2 presents the results. In our main specification (Column (1)) we find a
strong positive association between maternal mental health problems and her child’s
mental health disorders.7 In Column (2), we show that the results are robust when
we restrict our attention only to the depression/anxiety sub-components of the BPI.
Specifically, our results suggest that a one standard deviation improvement in maternal mental health is associated with a 0.24 standard deviation improvement in
her child’s mental health.8 The specification in Column (3) further controls for noncognitive maternal skills. Our results suggest a much lower correlation between a
child’s mental health disorders and her maternal non-cognitive skills, relative to the
correlation between a child’s mental health disorders and maternal mental health
problems.9
7

Our results are consistent with the findings of Frank and Meara (2009), although they have
different regression specifications and a different measure of maternal mental health. They consider
maternal depression in the following way: a depressed woman is such that scores 16 or higher in the
1992 CES-D assesment in NLSY79. In our case, we consider the continuous standardized measure
of CES-D as our measure of mental health.
8
We perform a similar analysis using data from the Millennium Cohort Study in the UK. Our
results (available upon request) suggest that for children with ages 3 to 14 years old, a one standard
deviation improvement in parental mental health is associated with a 0.30 standard deviation
improvement in the child’s mental health.
9
The coefficients of the non-cognitive measures remain mainly unchanged in magnitude when
we exclude maternal mental health from Column (3) in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2: Maternal Mental Health and Children’s Mental Health

Maternal Mental Health Disorders
Log Household Income
Mother’s Years of Education

(1)
Child Mental
Disorders (BPI)
0.282***
(0.026)
-0.085*
(0.046)
-0.047***
(0.012)

(2)
Depression/Anxiety

5-14 yo
Yes
0.126
1,519

5-14 yo
Yes
0.092
1,519

0.239***
(0.026)
-0.041
(0.038)
-0.003
(0.013)

Maternal Rosenberg Scale
Maternal Rotter-Locus Scale
Child’s age group
Demographic Controls
R-squared
Observations

(3)
Child Mental
Disorder (BPI)
0.266***
(0.027)
-0.068
(0.045)
-0.036***
(0.012)
-0.094***
(0.028)
-0.031
(0.027)
5-14 yo
Yes
0.136
1,519

Note: NSLY79 and NLSY79 Child/YA, cross-sectional sample from 1992. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions control for child’s gender and age, maternal race and marital
status. Maternal Mental Health Disorders measured by CES-D Depression Scale. Children’s Mental Health Disorders
measured by the Behavioral Problem Index. Maternal Rosenberg Scale is a 10-item self-esteem measure. Maternal
Rotter-Locus Scale captures self-control.

There are multiple potential mechanisms through which maternal mental health
disorders are transmitted to her child. First, there is the biologically rooted explanation where certain genetic markers are correlated with mental health, and these are
transmitted to children at birth (Center on the Developing Child at Harvard University (2009)). Second, mental health of mothers may directly affect the formation of
their children’s mental health through their ability of providing effective parenting.
Third, maternal mental health may also affect her child’s cognitive abilities through
the effect of the child’s mental health on the accumulation of cognitive skills.
We use three measures associated with family environment and parenting to show
that maternal mental health matters for parenting investments: the home inventory
index, parental emotional support and parental cognitive stimulation.10 Table 3.3
10

See Appendix 3.6.1 for detailed information on how these measures are built for children at
different ages.

103

presents the results based on the home inventory index for children of different ages.
Our results show a consistent pattern: worse maternal mental health is associated
with worse parenting practices, for children of ages 3 to 14 years old.11 In these
specifications, we control for non-cognitive skills of the mother and we observe that
maternal mental health and non-cognitive skills measured by the Rosenberg Scale are
both statistically significant. We report the results for the sub-components, cognitive
stimulation and emotional support, in Appendix 3.6.2 (Tables 3.10 and 3.11) and we
find similar results for both dimensions.12
Table 3.3: Maternal Mental Health and Parenting Practices

Maternal Mental Health Disorders
Maternal Rosenberg Scale
Maternal Rotter-Locus Scale
Child’s age group
Demographic variables
R-squared
Observations

Home Inventory Home Inventory
-0.116***
-0.100***
(0.044)
(0.031)
0.111**
0.098***
(0.043)
(0.036)
0.016
0.060
(0.039)
(0.037)
3-5
6-9
Yes
Yes
0.315
0.308
547
741

Home Inventory
-0.079***
(0.028)
0.193***
(0.034)
0.060**
(0.030)
10-14
Yes
0.368
697

Note NSLY79 and NLSY79 Child/YA, cross-sectional sample from 1992. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions control for household income, child’s gender, maternal race and
education, and her marital status. Maternal Mental Health Disorders measured by the CES-D Depression Scale.
Maternal Rosenberg Scale is a 10-item self-esteem measure. Maternal Rotter-Locus Scale captures self-control. Home
Inventory is a measure of parental practices.

11

In most of our analysis we focus on the sample of children ages 5 to 14 years old. For these
children we have information on the BPI but also on tests scores. However, we have information
on parenting practices starting at 3 years old and our measures of parenting practices are different
for the age groups 3 to 5 years old, 6 to 9 and 10 to 14 years old. To increase the sample size in our
group of young children, we focus on the pooled sample of 3 to 5 years old when studying parenting
practices. When studying test scores, we pool children of ages 5 to 9. Results remain unchanged
when we exclude 5-year-old children from our analysis of test scores.
12
Our results differ from Frank and Meara (2009), where they also use NLSY79 data. In their
case, they do not find significant results for cognitive stimulation. As mentioned before, it can
be due to different regressions specifications and definitions of maternal mental health. In another
study for the U.S., using PSID data, Ronda (2017) also finds that maternal distress affects maternal
time investments.
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We go one step further and confirm that parenting practices matter for a child’s
mental health. In Table 3.4, we report that a one standard deviation improvement
in home inventory, our aggregated measure of parenting practices, is associated with
a 0.29 to 0.31 standard deviation improvement in a child’s mental health. We show
the results for the index subcomponents in Appendix 3.6.2 (Tables 3.12 and 3.13),
where we report similar results across the two dimensions.13
Table 3.4: Parenting Practices and Children’s Mental Health

(1)
Child Mental
Health Disorders
Home Inventory
-0.306***
(0.051)
Child’s age group
3-5
Demographic variables
Yes
R-squared
0.159
Observations
391

(2)
Child Mental
Health Disorders
-0.285***
(0.045)
6-9
Yes
0.121
746

(3)
Child Mental
Health Disorders
-0.296***
(0.050)
10-14
Yes
0.090
703

Notes: NSLY79 and NLSY79 Child/YA, cross-sectional sample from 1992. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions control for household income, child’s gender, maternal race and
education, and marital status. Child Mental Health Disorders measured by the Behavioral Problem Index. Home
Inventory is a measure of parental practices.

We move now to report the relationship between maternal mental health and
children’s cognitive outcomes. We focus here in cognitive outcomes early in the life
of children, before they enter college or the labor market. As a measure of a child’s
cognition, we use the Peabody Individual Achievement Tests (PIAT) for Math and
Reading Recognition. One mechanism through which maternal mental health might
13

In non-reported results, we also use the Millennium Cohort Study sample to test a similar
hypothesis, associated with how mental health problems are associated with a worse family environment. We find that worse parental mental health increases conflict between parents and children,
and decreases closeness between them. Moreover, we find that these effects may have significant
implications on a child’s mental health: a one standard deviation increase in parent-child conflict is
associated with a 0.49 standard deviation increase in children’s mental health problems, whereas a
one standard deviation increase in parent-child closeness is associated with a 0.24 standard deviation
decrease in children’s mental health problems. These results are available upon request.
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affect her child’s cognitive outcomes is the child’s own mental health. We explore
then the relationship between a child’s own mental health and cognitive outcomes
and report the results in Table 3.5. We report that a child’s poor mental health is
correlated with lower test scores. More specifically, one standard deviation increase
in mental health disorders is associated with a 0.07 standard deviation decrease in
cognitive outcomes of children ages 5 to 9 (Columns (1) and (2)).1415 The effects
are larger for older children (Columns (3) and (4)). As a comparison, this effect is
equivalent to that of a 2-4 year decrease in maternal education.16
Table 3.5: Children’s Mental Health and Cognitive Outcomes
(1)
Math Score
Child Mental Health Disorders -0.072***
(0.017)
Child’s age group
5-9 yo
Demographic Controls
Yes
R-squared
0.623
Observations
836

(2)
(3)
Reading Score Math Score
-0.066***
-0.101***
(0.016)
(0.019)
5-9 yo
10-14 yo
Yes
Yes
0.613
0.278
815
599

(4)
Reading Score
-0.104***
(0.025)
10-14 yo
Yes
0.310
600

Notes: NSLY79 and NLSY79 Child/YA, cross-sectional sample from 1992. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions control for household income, child’s gender, maternal race and
education and her marital status. Child Mental Health Disorders measured by the Behavioral Problem Index. Math
Score from Math PIAT Score. Reading Score from Reading Recognition PIAT Score.

The previous results suggest that maternal mental health disorders may lead
to worse children’s cognitive skills via children’s mental health. We then explore
whether there are other mechanisms through which maternal mental health affect
children outcomes. We do this by adding controls for maternal mental health and
parenting practices to our specification in Table 3.5 (reported in Table 3.6). We
14

As mentioned before, since the PIAT tests are only implemented to children ages 5 and over,
we do not report here the age group 3-5 separately. Instead we decided to pool children ages 5 to
9 to increase the sample size and do not lose information on the younger children.
15
These results are consistent with the findings in Currie and Stabile (2007), where they study
the relation between children’s mental health and their cognitive development using the same instruments. We have a slight different set of controls in our regressions.
16
We find similar effects on the Millennium Cohort Study sample (results available upon request).
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observe that for younger children, good parenting offsets about half of the negative impacts of own mental health problems on cognitive outcomes, pointing to an
additional channel through which maternal mental health operates. There are no
additional direct effects of maternal mental health, after controlling for a child’s own
mental health and parenting practices. However, for older children, maternal mental
health has a negative impact on cognitive outcomes, even after controlling for parenting practices, the child’s own mental health disorders and maternal non-cognitive
skills.17 Then, it is not only the case that maternal mental health hinders the cognitive development of children by affecting their mental health, but also has a direct
negative impact that offsets the positive effect of good parenting. These results are
in line with the findings of Ronda (2017) but differ from Frank and Meara (2009).
We find consistent effects when we focus on the subcomponents of the Home Inventory Index, Emotional Support and Cognitive Stimulation (Table 3.16 in Appendix
3.6.2.)

17

We also report results for Reading Recognition (PIAT) on Appendix 3.6.2 Table 3.14, where
we observe analogous results. As a robustness specification, we run the same regressions excluding
children’s own mental health and home inventory, and we report that maternal mental health is
significantly related to math and reading recognition at ages 10-14 (results in Appendix 3.6.2 Table
3.15).
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Table 3.6: Parenting Practices, Maternal Mental Health, and Cognitive Development
(1)
Math Score
Home Inventory
0.036*
(0.019)
Child Mental Health Disorders
-0.071***
(0.019)
Maternal Mental Health Disorders
0.032
(0.021)
Maternal Rosenberg Scale
0.019
(0.018)
Maternal Rotter-Locus Scale
0.024
(0.018)
Child’s age group
5-9 yo
Demographic Controls
Yes
R-squared
0.625
Observations
776

(2)
Math Score
0.068**
(0.026)
-0.086***
(0.019)
-0.047***
(0.019)
-0.011
(0.023)
0.034
(0.025)
10-14 yo
Yes
0.342
610

Notes: NSLY79 and NLSY79 Child/YA, cross-sectional sample from 1992. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions control for household income, child’s gender, maternal race and
education and her marital status. Child Mental Health Disorders measured by the Behavioral Problem Index.
Maternal Mental Health Disorders measured by the CES-D Depression Scale. Math Score from Math PIAT Score.

Mental Health and Adult Outcomes
Finally, to close the inter-generational cycle, we explore the relation between a child’s
mental health and her adult outcomes. We consider three measures of adult outcomes: whether they have a college degree, the average real wages between ages 25
and 35, and mental health at the onset of adulthood (age 18). For this analysis, we
pool information on children that were 5 to 14 years old in 1992. We control for
demographic characteristics of a child’s household in that year.
We report our results in Table 3.7. We observe that children’s mental health
disorders are associated with worse outcomes in adulthood. A reduction of one
standard deviation in a child’s mental health is associated with 6.1 percentage points
lower chances of completing college education, a 15% decrease in mean wages in early
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adulthood and an increase of 0.43 standard deviations in our mental health disorder
index at age 18.18 In Table 3.17 in Appendix 3.6.2 we focus on children aged 10
to 14 years old and show that the negative impacts of mental health on long-term
outcomes persist even when we control for children’s cognitive outcomes.
Table 3.7: Children’s Mental Health and Long-term Outcomes
(1)
(2)
(3)
College attainment Wages (log) Adult Mental Disorder
Child Mental Health Disorder
-0.061***
-0.150***
0.427***
(0.012)
(0.029)
(0.115)
Child’s age group (in 1992)
5-14 yo
5-14 yo
5-14 yo
Demographic Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
1,565
1,347
825
R-squared
0.116
0.147
0.043

Notes: NSLY79 and NLSY79 Child/YA, cross-sectional sample from 1992. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions control for household income, child’s gender, maternal race and
education, and her marital status. Child Mental Health Disorders measured by the Behavioral Problem Index. Adult
Mental Health Disorders measured by the CES-D Depression Scale.

3.3

Model

The empirical results presented above depict a complex system through which poor
maternal mental health can lead to poor outcomes on children, both in the short
and in the long run. There are three potential mechanisms underlying this intergenerational pattern. First, poor mental health of children could be a direct result of
poor maternal mental health. Second, maternal mental health may affect parenting
practices that, in turn, affect children’s mental health and cognitive skills. Third, as
maternal mental health affects her child’s mental health, the latter can also affect
the accumulation of cognitive skills.
18

As expected, results are quantitatively larger in most dimensions when we focus on the sample
of children aged 10 to 14 in 1992. However, even mental health disorders early in life (ages 5 to 9)
have detrimental long term consequences (results available upon request).
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In addition, the empirical patterns suggest the importance of treating mental
health as a related but independent measure of human capital. We consider three
dimensions of human capital — mental health, non-cognitive skills, and cognitive
skills — for adults. In the case of children, due to data constraints, we only consider
children’s mental health and cognitive skills as their dimensions of human capital.
We provide a framework under which we can potentially disentangle the various
mechanisms described previously: we build a model of human capital development
of children where the inputs in the production function are children’s past cognitive
skills and mental health, maternal skills and mental health, and parental investments.

3.3.1

Production Function of Children’s Human Capital

We follow Attanasio, Cattan, Fitzsimons, Meghir, and Rubio-Codina (2020a) and
assume that the technology for skill formation is Cobb Douglas. This allows each
of the human capital measures — cognitive skills, non-cognitive skills, and mental
health — to be affected by parental investments, maternal skills and by past human
capital measures.19 In particular, we denote a child’s cognitive skills and mental
c
m
health at time t as θi,t
, θi,t
, respectively. We indicate maternal cognitive skills, non-

cognitive skills and mental health as θiP,c , θiP,n and θiP,m , respectively. For k ∈ {c, m},
k
children’s human capital θi,t
is produced by:

k
ln(θi,t+1
) = α0,k +

X
k

k
αkch ln(θi,t
)+

X p

I
αj ln(θiP,j ) + α1 ln(θi,t
) + εki,t+1

(3.1)

j

where θiP,j is a parental measure of skill j, where j ∈ {c, n, m} denotes cognitive
skills, non-cognitive skills and mental health, respectively. These measures are as19

Notice that this specification not only allows children’s mental health to affect their cognitive
ability, but also allows previous cognitive ability to affect their mental health. This is a plausible
mechanism, as students who perform poorly in school might suffer from anxiety about school
performance.
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I
sumed fixed across time periods. The term θi,t
represents parental investments, which

capture parenting support.20 The last term εki,t+1 reflects unobserved random shocks
that affect the child’s development.
Parental investments is an endogenous object in our model:

I
ln(θi,t
) = β0 +

X
k

k
βkch ln(θi,t
)+

X p

βj ln(θiP,j ) + β1 Xi,t + ηi,t+1

(3.2)

j

The empirical specification of investment in the model depends on the current
cognitive skills and mental health of the child, maternal cognitive and non-cognitive
skills, maternal mental health, household or parental characteristics Xi,t and random shocks ηi,t+1 . The family background characteristics include household income,
maternal marital status, maternal education and race. Parental investments can be
endogenous in the sense that mothers react to shocks in the development of their
children’s human capital, for instance, to compensate for a negative health shock.
In order to account for this potential endogeneity of investments in the estimation
of the parameters of the production function, in next steps in this paper, we plan to
incorporate prices for child investments (including books, materials for school, toys,
childcare, among others, at the state geographic level).21
The model for human capital production described above captures the mechanisms of intergenerational transmission of human capital previously described. The
p
mental health of the mother could affect children’s outcomes through αm
. Mater-

nal mental health, non-cognitive skills and cognitive skills may also affect parenting
investments through Equation 3.2 and, in turn, affect children outcomes through
α1 . Finally, the stock of children’s cognitive skills and mental health affects human
20

For estimation purposes, we consider measures related to cognitive stimulation and emotional
support.
21
In Attanasio, Meghir, and Nix (2020b) the authors consider prices for food, medications,
educational goods and clothing at the local level.
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capital development through αkch .

3.4

Estimation

A key difficulty in estimating factor models is that we do not observe skills, mental
P,j
I
k
for k ∈ {c, nc} and j ∈ {c, nc, m}), but
, θi,t
or θi,t
health or investments (θi,t

instead we observe imperfect measures. Our objective is to identify the distribution
of the latent factors using observed measures. We follow Attanasio, Meghir, and Nix
(2020b) and their assumptions to estimate the parameters of interest.
Denote the l-th measure of latent factor s at time t as msitl . The measures follow
the relationship:
msitl = astl + λstl ln θits + sitl

(3.3)

s
where the errors sitl are iid normal with sitl ∼ N (0, σitl
). The measurement system

is expressed as follows in matrix form:

Mi = A + Λ ln θi + Σi

(3.4)

where A is the collection of all location parameters astl and Λ is the matrix of factor
loadings λstl , with the (m, n) element being the factor loading of the n-th factor on
s
the m-th measure. Σ is a diagonal matrix collecting all σitl
on the diagonal.

One of the assumptions is that the log latent factors follow a mixed normal
distribution:
Fθ = τ ∗ Φ(µA , ΩA ) + (1 − τ ) ∗ Φ(µB , ΩB )

(3.5)

where τ ∈ (0, 1). Considering the measurement system in Equation 3.4, the measures
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also follow a mixed normal distribution:

Mi ∼ FM = τ Φ(ΠA , ΨA ) + (1 − τ )Φ(ΠB , ΨB )

(3.6)

where
a. ΠA = A + ΛµA
b. ΠB = A + ΛµB
c. ΨA = ΛΩA Λ0 + Σ
d. ΨB = ΛΩB Λ0 + Σ

The parameters in the mixed normal distribution of the measures, {ΠA , ΨA , ΠB , ΨB , τ },
can be directly estimated using MLE since the measures are observed. This step is
implemented using the Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm. For the identification of the parameters of the underlying factors’ distribution in Equation 3.5
and of the measurement Equation 3.4, we also follow the assumptions in Attanasio,
Meghir, and Nix (2020b):
• Assumption 1 (Normalization of Scale): λsit1 = 1 for all i, t, s.
• Assumption 2 (Mean Zero): τ ∗ µsA1 + (1 − τ ) ∗ µsB1 = 0. Here, we impose a
restriction on the mean of the log factor s at time 1. For one-period measures
(for instance, maternal mental health), the mean of the log will be zero. For
evolving factors, we only normalize the location for the first period.
• Assumption 3 (Time Invariance): astl = ast0 l for all t and t0 . This restriction
allows identification of the location of the factors.
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Overall, the estimated parameters {ΠA , ΨA , ΠB , ΨB , τ }, the assumptions stated
above and the restrictions in (a)-(d), provide sufficient restrictions to estimate the
remaining parameters using minimum distance: A, Λ, Σ, µA , µB , ΣA and ΣB . Once
we recover the parameters, we draw a synthetic data set to estimate the model using
regressions, generating estimates for the production function of children’s cognitive
skills and mental health as well as investment functions.
Given the estimation results on the importance of maternal mental health and
parental investments for the accumulation of children’s human capital, we will generate policy counterfactuals that address improvements in these dimensions. We plan
to conduct two type of exercises: in the first one, we would explore the impact of
ameliorating the mental health of the mothers by the average effect of successful
programs, such as cognitive behavioral therapy, that targets maternal depression or
anxiety. We could evaluate the effect of such interventions at different stages in
childhood or in the adolescence. In the second type of exercises, we would analyze
the effect of improving parenting practices at different ages of the child’s life and for
children from different economic backgrounds.

3.5

Conclusion

In this paper, we examine the role maternal mental health plays in the human capital
development of children, which subsumes cognitive skills and mental health. We
propose a model for the development of children’s human capital, where maternal
human capital is characterized by three dimensions: cognitive skills, non-cognitive
skills and mental health. In addition, parental investments and the child’s own
skills are productive inputs in this model. This setting is motivated by empirical
patterns we observe in the U.S., which will also be the key mechanisms in our model.
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First, poor maternal mental health is positively related with her child’s poor mental
health and negatively associated with her child’s cognitive development. Second,
maternal mental health problems are associated with worse parenting practices, such
as emotional support and cognitive stimulation. Third, poor children’s mental health
is related to lower children’s cognitive outcomes during school age. We describe
the estimation steps and potential policy counterfactual exercises that allows us to
learn about the importance of mental health for the intergenerational transmission of
poverty, as children’s mental health is positively correlated with long-term outcomes,
such as wages, education and mental health.
In future research, an extension of this model would include a measure of physical
health as a dimension of human capital. For such analysis, we would require rich
measures of health that include, for example, obesity, and bio-metrics such as cholesterol, blood pressure and sugar levels in blood and measures of parental investments
in quality of food intakes. This would be of particular relevance for the U.S., where
the prevalence of obesity was 42% in adults in 2017-2018 and around 10.5% of the
U.S. population have diabetes (Hales, Carroll, Fryar, and Ogden (2020)).22

22

Information on diabetes available at:
report/index.html
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https://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/data/statistics-

3.6

Appendix

3.6.1

Scales

In this section, we describe the scales used to proxy for cognitive skills, non-cognitive
skills and mental health. In this paper we use two data sets: NLSY79 and NLSY79
Child/YA, linking children and their mothers.

Scales for adults (NLSY79)
For mothers, we proxy cognitive skills using AFQT (Armed Forces Questionnaire
Test), non-cognitive skills using the Rosenberg Scale and Rotter-Locus Scale, and
mental health using the CES-D Scale (Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression
Scale).
• AFQT: We use the AFQT score reported at NLSY79, which is computed using the arithmetic reasoning, word knowledge, paragraph comprehension and
numerical operations components of the ASVAB test.
• Rosenberg Scale: This is a measure of self-esteem, a scale that includes the
following 10 items.
1. I am person of worth.
2. I have a number of good qualities.
3. I am inclined to feel I am a failure.
4. I am able to do things as well as most other people.
5. I felt I do not have much to be proud of.
6. I take a positive attitude toward myself.
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7. I am satisfied with myself.
8. I wish I could have more respect of myself.
9. I certainly feel useless at times.
10. At times I think I am no good at all.
• Rotter-Locus Control Scale: This captures whether individuals believe they
have control over their lives or it is the environment that controls their lives.
It includes the following four pair of statements.
1. Degree of control the respondent has over her direction of own life.
2. Importance of planning.
3. Importance of luck.
4. Degree of influence over own life.
• CES-D Scale: This scale measures depression, and includes seven statements
on how they felt during the week prior to the interview.
1. I felt depressed.
2. I felt sad.
3. I could not get going.
4. I did not feel like eating.
5. I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was doing.
6. I felt everything I did was an effort.
7. My sleep was restless.
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Scales for children (NLSY79 Child/YA)
• Behavioral Problem Index (BPI): We construct this variable using the following
components.
1. Antisocial
2. Headstrong
3. Anxious/Depressed
4. Hyperactive
5. Peer Problems
6. Dependent
Higher values of the components represent a higher level of behavioral disorders.23
• Depression/Anxiety: We construct this measure using only the Anxiety/Depression
component of the BPI. This measure is based on the following five sub-components:
1. Has sudden changes in mood of feeling.
2. Feels/complains no one loves her/him.
3. Is too fearful or anxious.
4. Feels worthless or inferior.
5. Is unhappy, sad, or depressed.
• Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT) for Math and Reading Recognition: This test is applied on children who are at least five years old. Results
23

The individuals components of each category and a more complete description can be found
in
https://www.nlsinfo.org/content/cohorts/nlsy79-children/other-documentation/
codebook-supplement/appendix-d-behavior-proble-0.

118

are based on the raw scores of the assessments, standardized to a normal with
mean zero and standard deviation of one.24

Parenting Practices (NLSY79 Child/YA)
• Home Observation Measurement of the Environment (HOME): It is a measure
of the quality of a child’s home environment, it includes two main components:
emotional support and cognitive stimulation.25
• Cognitive Stimulation: This component measures parental practices that promote cognitive development, including reading stories, helping the child with
numbers and shapes, taking the child to museum or outings, among others.
• Emotional Support: This component measures practices that promote emotional support and include, for example, parental practices when the child is
angry, hugging and answering the child’s requests verbally, among others.

3.6.2

Descriptive Evidence

Table 3.8: Correlation between the components of Mental Health and Non-Cognitive
Measures
Depression

Sad

Can’t keep going Poor appetite

Rosenberg Scale

-0.187

-0.131

-0.130

Rotter-Locus Scale

-0.115

-0.089

-0.107

Cannot focus

Extra Effort

Restless

-0.093

-0.119

-0.124

-0.078

-0.103

-0.097

-0.128

-0.081

Note: Data from NLSY79. Sample includes 3,108 women. The CES-D measure is composed of 7 items: feels
depressed, feels sad, cannot get going, does not feel like eating, has trouble keeping her mind on what she is doing,
feels everything she does is an effort and sleep is restless. Rosenberg Scale is 10-item self-esteem measure. RotterLocus Control Scale includes four pairs of measures that capture self-control.

24

More information on the PIAT assessment is available at: https://www.nlsinfo.org/
content/cohorts/nlsy79-children/topical-guide/assessments/piat-mathematics.
25
A complete list of the components of HOME from ages three to five is available
at:
https://www.nlsinfo.org/content/cohorts/nlsy79-children/other-documentation/
codebook-supplement/appendix-home-sf-scales/page/0/2/#AppendixA2B.
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Table 3.9: Correlation between Mental Health, Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Measures (Sample NLSY79 Child/YA)
Mental Health (CES-D)

Rosenberg Scale

Pearlin Scale

Mental Health (CES-D)

1.000

Rosenberg Scale 2004

-0.301

1.000

Pearlin Scale 2004

-0.305

0.651

1.000

BIG5 Personality Traits

-0.174

0.248

0.247

BIG-5 Personality Traits

1.000

Note: Data from NLSY79 Child/YA, at year 2004. Sample includes 2,431 young adults, who are between 15 and 25
years old. The CES-D measure is composed of 7 items: feels depressed, feels sad, cannot get going, does not feel like
eating, has trouble keeping her mind on what she is doing, feels everything she does is an effort and sleep is restless.
Rosenberg Scale is 10-item self-esteem measure. Pearlin Scale measures self-concept and whether individuals perceive
their are in control of events that affect their lives. Big-5 Personality Traits measure openness, conscientiousness,
extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism.

Table 3.10: Maternal Mental Health and Emotional Support
(1)
Emotional
Support
Maternal Mental Health Disorders -0.094**
(0.043)
Maternal Rosenberg Scale
0.107**
(0.044)
Maternal Rotter-Locus Scale
-0.021
(0.043)
Child’s age group
3-5
Demographic variables
Yes
R-squared
0.194
Observations
523

(2)
Emotional
Support
-0.110***
(0.033)
0.062
(0.041)
0.004
(0.040)
6-9
Yes
0.265
680

(3)
Emotional
Support
-0.096***
(0.034)
0.101***
(0.038)
0.064*
(0.035)
10-14
Yes
0.299
612

Note: NSLY79 and NLSY79 Child/YA, cross-sectional sample from 1992. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions control for household income, child’s gender, maternal race and
education, and her marital status. Maternal Mental Health Disorders measured by the CES-D Depression Scale.
Emotional Support is a sub-component of the HOME Inventory for parental practices.
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Table 3.11: Maternal Mental Health and Cognitive Stimulation
(1)
Cognitive
Stimulation
Maternal Mental Health Disorders
-0.096**
(0.047)
Maternal Rosenberg Scale
0.059
(0.051)
Maternal Rotter-Locus Scale
0.064
(0.043)
Child’s age group
3-5
Demographic variables
Yes
R-squared
0.236
Observations
522

(2)
Cognitive
Stimulation
-0.061*
(0.034)
0.090**
(0.035)
0.095**
(0.037)
6-9
Yes
0.252
707

(3)
Cognitive
Stimulation
-0.034
(0.032)
0.203***
(0.038)
0.035
(0.033)
10-14
Yes
0.260
690

Note: NSLY79 and NLSY79 Child/YA, cross-sectional sample from 1992. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions control for household income, child’s gender, maternal race and
education, and her marital status. Maternal Mental Health Disorders measured by the CES-D Depression Scale.
Cognitive Stimulation is a sub-component of the HOME Inventory for parental practices.

Table 3.12: Emotional Support and Children’s Mental Health
(1)
Child Mental
Health Disorders
Emotional Support
-0.241***
(0.053)
Child’s age group
3-5
Demographic variables
Yes
R-squared
0.130
Observations
373

(2)
Child Mental
Health Disorders
-0.129***
(0.043)
6-9
Yes
0.076
689

(3)
Child Mental
Health Disorders
-0.257***
(0.050)
10-14
Yes
0.092
610

Note: NSLY79 and NLSY79 Child/YA, cross-sectional sample from 1992. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions control for household income, child’s gender, maternal race and
education, and her marital status. Child Mental Health Disorders measured by the Behavioral Problem Index.
Emotional Support is a sub-component of the HOME Inventory for parental practices.
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Table 3.13: Cognitive Stimulation and Children’s Mental Health
(1)
Child Mental
Health Disorders
Cognitive Stimulation
-0.245***
(0.053)
Child’s age group
3-5
Demographic variables
Yes
R-squared
0.134
Observations
371

(2)
Child Mental
Health Disorders
-0.308***
(0.043)
6-9
Yes
0.131
715

(3)
Child Mental
Health Disorders
-0.190***
(0.048)
10-14
Yes
0.063
695

Note: NSLY79 and NLSY79 Child/YA, cross-sectional sample from 1992. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions control for household income, child’s gender, maternal race and
education, and her marital status. Child Mental Health Disorders measured by the Behavioral Problem Index.
Cognitive Stimulation is a sub-component of the HOME Inventory for parental practices.

Table 3.14: Parenting Practices, Maternal Mental Health, and Cognitive Development (Reading)
(1)
Reading Score
Home Inventory
0.048***
(0.018)
Child Mental Health Disorders
-0.058***
(0.017)
Maternal Mental Health Disorders
0.013
(0.017)
Maternal Rosenberg Scale
0.019
(0.018)
Maternal Rotter-Locus Scale
0.007
(0.017)
Child’s age group
5-9 yo
Demographic Controls
Yes
R-squared
0.620
Observations
756

(2)
Reading Score
0.060*
(0.031)
-0.089***
(0.026)
-0.085***
(0.027)
0.016
(0.028)
0.028
(0.027)
10-14 yo
Yes
0.353
611

Note: NSLY79 and NLSY79 Child/YA, cross-sectional sample from 1992. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions control for household income, child’s gender, maternal race and
education, and her marital status. Child Mental Health Disorders measured by the Behavioral Problem Index
and Maternal Mental Health Disorders measured by the CES-D Depression Scale. Reading Score from Reading
Recognition PIAT Score. Home Inventory is a measure of parental practices. Maternal Rosenberg Scale is a 10-item
self-esteem measure. Maternal Rotter-Locus Scale captures self-control.
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Table 3.15: Maternal Mental Health and Cognitive Development (Math and Reading)
(1)
Math Score
Maternal Mental Health Disorders
-0.005
(0.019)
Child’s age group
5-9 yo
Demographic Controls
Yes
R-squared
0.610
Observations
865

(2)
Math Score
-0.074***
(0.017)
10-14 yo
Yes
0.286
673

(3)
Reading Score
-0.008
(0.018)
5-9 yo
Yes
0.606
843

(4)
Reading Score
-0.105***
(0.023)
10-14 yo
Yes
0.310
675

Note: NSLY79 and NLSY79 Child/YA, cross-sectional sample from 1992. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions control for household income, child’s gender, maternal race and
education, and her marital status. Maternal Mental Health Disorders measured by the CES-D Depression Scale.
Math Score from Math PIAT Score. Reading Score from Reading Recognition PIAT Score.

Table 3.16: Parenting Practices, Maternal Mental Health, and Cognitive Development (Math and Reading)

Emotional Support

(1)
Math Score
0.008
(0.018)

Cognitive Stimulation
Child Mental Health Disorders
Maternal Mental Health Disorders
Maternal Rosenberg Scale
Maternal Rotter-Locus Scale
Child’s age group
Demographic Controls
R-squared
Observations

-0.077***
(0.019)
0.027
(0.021)
0.021
(0.018)
0.020
(0.018)
5-9 yo
Yes
0.625
749

(2)
Math Score

0.042**
(0.019)
-0.062***
(0.019)
0.028
(0.021)
0.019
(0.018)
0.022
(0.018)
5-9 yo
Yes
0.623
758

(3)
Math Score
0.041
(0.025)

-0.083***
(0.020)
-0.044**
(0.019)
-0.004
(0.024)
0.044*
(0.026)
10-14 yo
Yes
0.319
572

(4)
Math Score

0.060**
(0.024)
-0.089***
(0.019)
-0.049***
(0.019)
-0.010
(0.023)
0.035
(0.025)
10-14 yo
Yes
0.339
605

Note: NSLY79 and NLSY79 Child/YA, cross-sectional sample from 1992. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions control for household income, child’s gender, maternal race and
education, and her marital status. Child Mental Health Disorders measured by the Behavioral Problem Index and
Maternal Mental Health Disorders measured by the CES-D Depression Scale. Math Score from Math PIAT Score.
Emotional Support and Cognitive Stimulation are sub-components of the HOME Inventory for parental practices.
Maternal Rosenberg Scale is a 10-item self-esteem measure. Maternal Rotter-Locus Scale captures self-control.
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Table 3.17: Children’s Mental Health and Long-term Outcomes (10-14 years old)
(1)
(2)
(3)
College attainment Wages (log) Adult Mental Health Disorders
Child Mental Health Disorders
-0.038*
-0.159***
0.741***
(0.020)
(0.048)
(0.197)
Child Cognition
0.126***
0.252***
-0.526
(0.039)
(0.090)
(0.356)
Child’s age group
10-14 yo
10-14 yo
10-14 yo
Demographic Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
R-squared
0.099
0.195
0.089
Observations
593
531
273

Note: NSLY79 and NLSY79 Child/YA, cross-sectional sample from 1992. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions control for household income, child’s gender, maternal race and
education, and her marital status. Child Mental Health Disorders measured by the Behavioral Problem Index. Adult
Mental Health Disorders measured by the CES-D Depression Scale. Child Cognition measured by the Math PIAT
Score.
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